20VC with Harry Stebbings

SpaceX Launches Largest Ever IPO | OpenAI Files to Go Public | Uber Cuts 23% of HR

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21 min read

Summary

At-a-Glance

  • Verdict: Watch fully
  • Core thesis: SpaceX's $75B IPO at $1.77T valuation using fixed pricing is high-risk but iconic; OpenAI and others rushing public as capital markets enable mega-exits; efficiency wars in AI (Cursor at 500M ARR with 146 people) signal structural shift to leaner startups leveraging intelligence over headcount.
  • Why it matters: This captures the largest IPO ever, the convergence of AI capital needs forcing public markets, and fundamental changes in startup efficiency economics that will reshape talent/investment/go-to-market for a decade.
  • Best use: Watch for IPO mechanisms, efficiency benchmarks (revenue per employee), capital allocation insights, and Rory's framework on when companies must go public vs. stay private.

Executive Summary

SpaceX launches the largest IPO roadshow in history at $1.77 trillion, but Elon bypassed traditional price discovery by fixing shares at $135, accepting more risk for speed. The book is only 2x covered—low by IPO standards—raising real probability of a flat or down open. Rory gives it 1/3 chance down, 1/3 flat, 1/3 up on day one, but expects valuation to revert below IPO price within 12 months given 70x forward sales. Jason notes this is once-in-a-decade, but LPs now expect 7–8x routinely, raising the bar for all founders.

OpenAI filed to go public (non-confidentially) but hedged timing to manage expectations. The hosts see this as recognition that model companies need public capital markets given spend scale (OpenAI's last private round was $122B). Apple's Gemini deal for $1B is pragmatic repair of Siri, not surrender—consumer AI is about experiences, not productivity, and Apple controls the handset. Persistent/always-on AI (OpenAI's Dreaming V3 memory upgrade) is inevitable and will make non-persistent AI feel archaic within two years.

Cursor hit $4B ARR targeting $6B by year-end; Lovable hit $500M ARR with 146 employees. This efficiency (3M+ per head vs. Salesforce's 350K) is structural, not temporary: startups spending 50–70% of revenue on intelligence (tokens) can't also spend on large headcount. Jason believes future startups will be half the size for equivalent revenue, but Rory notes enterprise sales still require bodies—foundation models will look like Oracle sales forces. Elon's Cursor acquisition for 10x end-of-year revenue looks prescient; he turned data center risk into $24B/year compute revenue (Anthropic + Google) plus backfill from Cursor.

Revolut raising at $115B (doing $4.5B revenue, $1.5B operating income) and Ramp at $44B (crossed $1B ARR, positive FCF) show fintechs trade like financial services adjusted for growth—valuations hold only if growth persists. Bending Spoons (Evernote, AOL, Vimeo roll-up) filing at $20B on $1.3B revenue is consumer Vista: cut costs, raise prices 80%, harvest inertia customers who won't churn. Organic growth is minimal, but it's profitable. Databricks raised another round at $165B (up from $134B) because unlike model companies, it doesn't need public markets yet—software companies have manageable capital needs vs. foundation models' 2–3 orders of magnitude more.

Key Takeaways

  • Claim: SpaceX's fixed-price IPO at $1.77T is high-risk; only 2x covered book suggests flat or down open, not the usual pop. | Evidence: Elon set $135/share in advance instead of night-before price discovery; bankers normally aim for 10x oversubscribed to ensure pop. At 2x and $75B raise, probability of breaking IPO price is higher than usual 10%. | Caveat: Rory admits no one knows day-one outcome with certainty given the novel mechanism and time gap between recording (Tuesday) and actual pricing (Thursday night). | Implication: If you're evaluating IPO strategy, fixed pricing without demand data increases risk but appeals to Elon's appetite for risk. Expect medium-term valuation correction below IPO price (Rory's call) given 70x forward sales base rate. | Timestamp: 00:00–08:30
  • Claim: LPs are recalibrating expectations: 7–8x returns are now routine bar, not outlier, post-SpaceX/Anthropic/OpenAI mega-exits. | Evidence: Jason spoke to an LP getting liquidity from Cerebrus and other deals who said 'little $5–8B IPOs don't make the math work anymore.' Ontario Teachers will make $10B+ from SpaceX. | Caveat: This is extrapolation from once-in-a-decade events. Jason warns against assuming every deal will be a trillion-dollar outcome; fund size dictates required market cap. | Implication: Founders and GPs face rising performance expectations. If you're raising a $10B fund, you need outcomes big enough to move the needle, not just $8B exits. | Timestamp: 08:30–13:00
  • Claim: OpenAI, Anthropic, and SpaceX rushing public because foundation model capital needs (OpenAI last raised $122B private) exceed private market capacity. | Evidence: Rory: 'Three reasons to go public: capital, currency for M&A, shareholder liquidity. Model companies need capital at scale private markets can't sustain.' Databricks raised $165B but doesn't need public because it's software, not a model—0.1% of OpenAI's last round. | Caveat: Timing is also opportunistic: market is risk-on, and 2024 is noisy with multiple mega-IPOs, so some may wait for cleaner 2025 window. | Implication: If you're in AI infra/models, plan for public markets sooner than traditional software. If you're enterprise SaaS, private rounds remain viable longer. | Timestamp: 13:00–18:00
  • Claim: Persistent, always-on AI (OpenAI's Dreaming V3 memory architecture) will make current browser-based AI feel archaic within two years. | Evidence: Jason: 'It's silly AI lives in browsers—we're still in the Netscape era. Memory means better answers and lower token costs because you're not passing context every time.' Apple's Gemini integration is a step toward AI knowing your calendar, contacts, context. | Caveat: Consumer AI is about delightful experiences, not productivity (Ben Thompson: 'consumers don't want to work'). Enterprise has validated AI for automation/efficiency; consumer is tougher. | Implication: If you're building consumer AI, focus on seamless experiences leveraging device context (Apple's advantage). If enterprise, memory/context will be table stakes for cost and UX. | Timestamp: 18:00–24:00
  • Claim: Cursor ($4B ARR targeting $6B) and Lovable ($500M ARR, 146 employees) prove startups can be half the size for equivalent revenue by spending on intelligence, not headcount. | Evidence: Lovable: 3M+ revenue per head vs. Salesforce 350K. Cursor pushing more features than any prior generation despite small team. Salesforce spends 1% of revenue per head on tokens; Cursor/Lovable spend 50–70% on tokens, so no room for also spending 50–70% on employees. | Caveat: This model works for PLG and product-led companies. Enterprise sales (Harvey, Sierra, foundation models) still require large go-to-market teams—Rory expects them to look like Oracle/SAP sales forces. Also, Replit is hiring 250 sales reps, showing not everyone stays lean. | Implication: As a founder, target $1–2M revenue per employee minimum. As an investor, startups will be half the size they used to be. As an employee, join companies with high revenue per head—you'll make more and have more leverage. | Timestamp: 24:00–38:00
  • Claim: Elon's Cursor acquisition for $4B (10x end-of-year revenue) was prescient: he turned data center 'loss' into $24B/year compute revenue plus Cursor backfill. | Evidence: Elon built Colossus 1 & 2, spent $20–30B on compute in advance of revenue. Now sells $2B/month to Anthropic ($1.25B) and Google ($950M), totaling $24B/year. Cursor fills remaining capacity at $6B run rate. | Caveat: This doesn't mean Elon has a competitive foundation model—he's 'the most efficient CoreWeave with the lowest cost of capital.' He's winning on compute, not models. | Implication: If you're building infrastructure, conviction on a trend plus capital advantage can turn early risk into dominant position. Cursor deal shows vertical integration (compute + application) working. | Timestamp: 38:00–44:00
  • Claim: Microsoft launching models that can't even search the web (flashback to ChatGPT's 'knowledge cutoff' problem) shows how hard it is to catch up to Anthropic/OpenAI. | Evidence: Jason: 'It's a flashback to when everything was September 2024. If Microsoft can't add web search, can they really keep pace?' Microsoft needed to do this to stop pretending their AI plan is 'partner with OpenAI,' but reviews say it's not even as good as best open-source. | Caveat: Microsoft doesn't need to be the best—they can grind to 'good enough' like Azure vs. AWS. The question is whether low-end intelligence work is sufficient market, or if oligopoly dominance (Anthropic/OpenAI) kills pricing. | Implication: If you're a startup relying on open-source Chinese models (Qwen, DeepSeek), monitor export controls and sustainability. U.S. open-source competitive threat (Reflection, Poolside) matters for ecosystem vs. monopoly risk. | Timestamp: 44:00–52:00
  • Claim: Revolut at $115B and Ramp at $44B will trade like financial services companies adjusted for growth—not sustained tech multiples. | Evidence: Revolut doing $4.5B revenue, $1.5B operating income; Ramp crossed $1B ARR. Rory: 'Banks trade at 12x earnings, not 40–50x. Fintechs get premium for growth, but if growth normalizes, multiples compress.' Brex slowed to 30–40% growth and sold for 6x. | Caveat: Revolut exists because European banks were 'fat, dumb, and happy' with high FX fees. Ramp's efficiency is real, but at $1.25B ARR, they're trading at 30–40x revenue—sustainable only if growth persists. | Implication: If you're investing in fintechs, bet on sustained high growth or expect reversion to financial services multiples. If you're building fintech, your edge is inefficiency of incumbents—find the fattest, dumbest banks. | Timestamp: 52:00–58:00
  • Claim: Bending Spoons (Evernote, AOL, Vimeo, WeTransfer) is consumer Vista: buy dying brands, cut 80% of marketing, raise prices 80%, harvest inertia customers. | Evidence: Filing at $20B on $1.3B revenue. Rory: '90% growth last year, but most is acquisition. Organic growth is price increases, not unit growth. Anyone who hasn't churned from AOL in 26 years won't churn until they die.' Founder letter: 'Finding PMF is luck; execution machine after that requires no luck.' | Caveat: This is not a growth multiple story—organic growth is minimal. It's a profitable cash cow model. Top 3 properties (AOL, Eventbrite, Vimeo) are 80% of revenue. Should trade at 10–15x revenue, not 20x. | Implication: If you're a roll-up investor, consumer internet has same playbook as enterprise PE (Vista, Thoma Bravo). If you're a founder of a dying brand, you're a target—expect inbound from Bending Spoons offering 1–2x revenue. | Timestamp: 58:00–1:06:00
  • Claim: Uber cutting 23% of HR (denying AI role despite 95% engineer adoption) signals HR as ripe for AI disruption, but autonomous driving progress is the bigger story. | Evidence: Jason: 'An AI VP of HR can evaluate every bit of your work, find if it's really your idiot boss, process far more than biased humans.' Uber rolling out robotaxis in Madrid with WeRider. Travis Kalanick devotees say cutting autonomous project in 2016 was fatal error. | Caveat: Hard to know if 23% cut is AI-driven or just rationalization. Dario's thesis is 5–50% of knowledge work tasks automated—23% felt high to hosts. Autonomous driving still moving slower than anticipated (Waymo took years to scale beyond SF). | Implication: If you're in HR tech, build AI tools that replace VP-level judgment, not just admin. If you're Uber, robotaxi is existential—either you add robotaxis to fleet and continue, or you get disrupted. Europe doing something (Madrid) is notable given usual tech lag. | Timestamp: 1:06:00–1:12:00

Detailed Brief

SpaceX IPO: Largest Ever, Fixed Price, High Risk

  • Claims: SpaceX begins $75B IPO roadshow at $1.77T valuation, pricing fixed at $135/share in advance; Only 2x covered book vs. typical 8–10x for IPOs of this capital scale; Elon short-circuited price discovery, accepting more risk but appealing to his risk appetite; Rory gives 1/3 probability each: down, flat, or up on day one; Medium-term (12 months), Rory expects valuation below IPO price given 70x forward sales base rate
  • Evidence: Traditional IPOs do price discovery night before open to create 10–15% pop; Elon announced price weeks ahead; Even with perfect price discovery, 10% of IPOs still break issue price; SpaceX is iconic company, amazing outcome, but valuation skepticism remains; Ontario Teachers will make $10B+; University of Washington (not in Washington state or city) also has savvy CIO; S-1 went through SEC very quickly, 'probably because we don't regulate anything anymore'
  • Caveats: Recording on Tuesday, pricing Thursday night—time gap means scrutiny will be intense; No one knows day-one outcome with certainty given novel mechanism; Even if it dips, it's still a huge win for Elon and early investors
  • Implications: If you're evaluating IPO strategy, fixed pricing increases error but fits Elon's MO; LPs now expect 7–8x returns routinely post-mega-exits, raising bar for all GPs and founders; If you're a founder, don't extrapolate once-in-a-decade events as new norm

OpenAI and Capital Market Imperatives

  • Claims: OpenAI filed to go public (non-confidentially) but hedged timing to manage expectations; Foundation model companies need public capital markets because spend is 2–3 orders of magnitude more than software; OpenAI's last private round was $122B; Anthropic's was $30B; Databricks' was $165B (0.1% of OpenAI's); Market is risk-on, so everyone gunning for exit in 2024 or early 2025; Three reasons to go public: capital, currency for M&A, shareholder liquidity
  • Evidence: Rory: 'They're finally managing expectations—preemptively saying we're not committing to timeline so no negative stories if it slips'; SpaceX, OpenAI, Anthropic all rushing to door because scale requires public markets; Jason's LP said 'little $5–8B IPOs don't make the math work anymore'; Databricks can stay private longer because software capex is manageable vs. model training
  • Caveats: 2024 is noisy year with multiple mega-IPOs; some may wait for cleaner 2025 window; Not all need public markets equally—software companies like Databricks have more time
  • Implications: If you're in AI infra/models, plan for public markets sooner than traditional software; If you're enterprise SaaS, private rounds remain viable longer; Expect more mega-exits in fall 2024 if market stays risk-on

Persistent AI and Always-On Future

  • Claims: OpenAI shipped Dreaming V3, biggest memory architecture upgrade since launch; Persistent, always-on AI will make current browser-based AI feel archaic within two years; Memory means better answers and lower token costs (don't pass context every time); Apple's Gemini deal ($1B to Google vs. $20B Google pays Apple for search default) is pragmatic repair of Siri; Consumer AI is about delightful experiences, not productivity (Ben Thompson: 'consumers don't want to work')
  • Evidence: Jason: 'It's silly AI lives in browsers—we're still in Netscape era'; Apple controls handset, has context (calendar, contacts, location), can deliver unique consumer experience; Rory: 'Memory should know who I am after 58 20VC podcast lookups'; Token economics improve with memory because you're not re-sending full context
  • Caveats: Apple should have had own model, but pragmatically fixing Siri is better than doing nothing; Consumer space tougher for OpenAI than enterprise—consumers want relaxation/entertainment, not complex research; Enterprise AI validated for automation/efficiency; consumer AI needs different playbook
  • Implications: If building consumer AI, focus on seamless experiences leveraging device context (Apple's advantage); If enterprise, memory/context will be table stakes for cost and UX; OpenAI faces tough competition from Apple and Google in consumer space; enterprise is clearer win

Efficiency Wars: Cursor, Lovable, and Revenue Per Employee

  • Claims: Cursor hit $4B ARR targeting $6B by year-end; Lovable hit $500M ARR with 146 employees; Lovable: 3M+ revenue per head vs. Salesforce 350K per head—9x more efficient; Startups spending 50–70% of revenue on intelligence (tokens) can't also spend on large headcount; Jason: Future startups will be half the size for equivalent revenue, including enterprise; Rory: Enterprise sales still require bodies—foundation models will look like Oracle/SAP sales forces
  • Evidence: Salesforce: $300K revenue per head, spends 1% of revenue per head on tokens, pays employees <$200K to be profitable; Cursor/Lovable: $2.3M revenue per head, spends 70% on tokens, can pay 146 employees whatever they want; These companies pushing more features than any prior generation despite small teams; Replit hiring 250 sales reps this year—showing not everyone stays lean; Anthropic has <5,000 employees; most enterprise sales not allowed to talk to human
  • Caveats: Model works for PLG/product-led companies; enterprise (Harvey, Sierra, law firms) still needs big sales teams; Not all startups can be 147 people at $500M—some need enterprise motion with bodies; Different business models: PLG vs. enterprise, intelligence-heavy vs. labor-heavy
  • Implications: As founder, target $1–2M revenue per employee minimum; Jason: 'I'm contentious of startups that need to be fat—what's your excuse?'; As investor, startups will be half the size they used to be—this changes talent market and economics; As employee, join companies with high revenue per head—you'll make more and matter more (one of 172 vs. one of 90,000); If you're building infrastructure and leveraging intelligence, you can achieve way more with fewer people; If AI is meant to augment humans and do $1T revenue, by definition you need $1T of efficiencies (less humans per task)

Elon's Compute Play and Cursor Acquisition

  • Claims: Elon spent $20–30B on Colossus 1 & 2 in advance of revenue, betting AI mattered; Now sells $2B/month compute to Anthropic ($1.25B) and Google ($950M), totaling $24B/year; Cursor acquisition for $4B (10x end-of-year revenue) backfills remaining capacity; Elon is 'the most efficient CoreWeave with the lowest cost of capital,' not a foundation model leader
  • Evidence: January 1: 'Look at all those data centers and you don't have a foundation model—you're screwed'; June 9: '$24B compute business + Cursor at $6B run rate running on my servers'; Founders Fund wrote Cursor check in 2008 (16 years ago, not last decade); 10x since then; Elon met the AI moment by showing up and spending with conviction
  • Caveats: This doesn't mean Elon has competitive foundation model—he's winning on compute, not models; He found two biggest competitors (Anthropic, Google) who want to buy from him
  • Implications: If you're building infrastructure, conviction on trend + capital advantage can turn early risk into dominant position; Cursor deal shows vertical integration (compute + application) working—backfill capacity with your own demand; Elon's playbook: take big risks, spend before revenue, leverage cost of capital advantage

Fintech Valuations and Growth Imperative

  • Claims: Revolut raising at $115B (doing $4.5B revenue, $1.5B operating income); Ramp raised $750M at $44B (crossed $1B ARR, positive FCF; some sources say $1.25B ARR); Fintechs trade like financial services companies adjusted for growth—not sustained tech multiples; Banks trade at 12x earnings, not 40–50x; if growth slows, multiples compress
  • Evidence: Revolut exists because European banks were 'fat, dumb, and happy' with high FX fees (pre-single currency had lots of transporter bullshit); Chime worth $5B because US banks more efficient than European banks; Brex slowed to 30–40% growth and sold for 6x; Ramp trading at 30–40x revenue—sustainable only if growth persists
  • Caveats: At some point, largest bank by market cap doesn't do much lending—that's a real problem because banking is about recycling savings into lending; Revolut not a long-term lender yet
  • Implications: If you're investing in fintechs, bet on sustained high growth or expect reversion to financial services multiples; If you're building fintech, your edge is inefficiency of incumbents—find fattest, dumbest banks; Ramp's AI story and adoption story are well-executed; as long as growth continues, math works

Bending Spoons: Consumer Vista Roll-Up

  • Claims: Bending Spoons (Evernote, AOL, Vimeo, WeTransfer, Eventbrite) filing at $20B on $1.3B revenue; Consumer internet version of early Vista/Thoma Bravo: buy companies, cut costs, raise prices, harvest inertia customers; Grew 90% last year, but most is acquisition; organic growth is price increases, not unit growth; Top 3 properties (AOL, Eventbrite, Vimeo) are 80% of revenue
  • Evidence: Rory: 'They buy these things, cut 80% of marketing spend other than high ROI, focus team on features, raise prices 80% over two years'; 10–20% of existing users churn, but net retention is reasonably decent (below 100 but decent); Anyone who hasn't churned from AOL in 26 years won't churn until they die; Evernote pricing raised from $75 to $250/year on average; Founder letter: 'Finding PMF is continuous mission of luck; execution machine built after that requires no luck at all'
  • Caveats: This is not a growth multiple story—organic growth is minimal; it's a profitable cash cow; Should trade at 10–15x revenue, not 20x, because relying on acquisition for growth; Jason turned around is generous—they cut employees (Evernote with 1/5th of employees) and raised prices
  • Implications: If you're roll-up investor, consumer internet has same playbook as enterprise PE; If you're founder of dying brand with sticky users, you're a target—expect inbound at 1–2x revenue; Everyone was playing enterprise space; Bending Spoons realized similar opportunity in consumer because European banks were inefficient (orthogonal play); Jason: 'Sounds better to me than starting something from scratch—there's 800 unicorns to buy, just go buy those'

Microsoft Catching Up (or Not) in AI

  • Claims: Microsoft launched new models that can't even search the web (flashback to 'knowledge cutoff' problem); This is final recognition Microsoft can't have core foundational technology it doesn't control; Microsoft and OpenAI are 'somewhere between open relationship and divorced'; Reviews are good but not even as good as best open-source
  • Evidence: Jason: 'If Microsoft launches models that don't search web, can we really keep up with pace at Anthropic?'; Pace of change at Anthropic/OpenAI is so rapid, so much progress, hard to predict if anyone can catch up; Microsoft needed to do this—can't pretend AI plan is 'partner with OpenAI' anymore; They tell story about local use and range of models (Rory: 'I read as: we don't have to be the very best because we know we're not')
  • Caveats: Microsoft doesn't need to be the best—they can grind to 'good enough' like Azure vs. AWS; They never caught up in mobile or search, but did catch up in cloud compute; They'll become next sucking sound for talent and money, need to add stuff other guys added two years ago
  • Implications: Big question: between Microsoft and open-source vendors, will there be a non-Chinese U.S. open-source vendor within spitting distance of frontier models?; That matters a lot from pricing perspective (oligopoly vs. ecosystem); If you're startup relying on Chinese open-source (Qwen, DeepSeek), monitor export controls and sustainability—some going closed-source; U.S. open-source competitive threat (Reflection, Poolside) matters for whether this is oligopoly or 4–5 players in two years

Founder Horror Stories and VC Rejection

  • Claims: Greg Eisenberg tweet led to hundreds of founders sharing horror stories about VC fundraising; Cloudflare CEO (Matthew) upset that Vinod Khosla suggested getting rid of CTO Michelle and giving him her shares; Jason: Founders hold grudges way more than VCs; rejections cut deep because you're selling yourself, not just product; Rory: VCs turn down 99 out of 100 deals—default is no, so high customer sat is impossible
  • Evidence: Jason: 'I had those stories too as a founder. One VC constantly used me to do diligence on competitor. It burned me. Now I'm zen—just take meeting and do reverse intel.'; Only true grudge-worthy issue is getting fired (e.g., Uber folks hating Benchmark); If you're treated poorly during fundraising, get over it—it's sales. Have you never had a customer say 'of course we'll buy' and then ghost you?; Rory: 'VC 30 years ago said: you never forget the LP turndowns. 30 years later, he's so right.'; Vinod said very clearly he doesn't believe the Cloudflare story happened as described
  • Caveats: Jason: 'I'm a super fan of Michelle—I would not make that suggestion. But VCs do see unbalanced teams and have to say something.'; Rory: 'Vinod has been on Midas list twice—Juniper 30 years ago and OpenAI this year—so he must be doing something right overall.'; In course of turning down 200–300 people a year for 30 years, some breakage is inevitable
  • Implications: As founder, grow thick skin—rejection is part of sales; don't hold grudges unless you got fired; As VC, be aware of how rejections land; if you screw up, apologize later and move on; Harry (contrarian take): 'Best revenge is forgetting they existed. LPs who turned me down at 21 now ping me and I'm like, who are you?'

Notable Concepts & Terms

  • Price discovery: Traditional IPO process where bankers build book and pick price night before open to create pop; Elon bypassed this by fixing SpaceX price weeks ahead
  • 2x covered book: IPO demand metric—orders are 2x the shares available. Typical IPOs want 8–10x to ensure pop; 2x suggests weaker demand or insufficient coverage for mega-raise
  • 70x forward sales: Valuation metric for SpaceX—trading at 70 times forward revenue. Base rate for IPOs >10x forward sales is high dip probability
  • Persistent/always-on AI: AI that continuously runs, remembers context, and integrates into daily life (vs. browser-based chat sessions). OpenAI's Dreaming V3 memory upgrade is step toward this
  • Token economics: Cost structure of AI companies spending on inference tokens. Cursor/Lovable spend 50–70% of revenue on tokens (intelligence), leaving no room for also spending 50–70% on employees (labor)
  • Revenue per employee: Key efficiency metric. Lovable: $3M+ per head. Salesforce: $350K per head. Future startups targeting $1–2M minimum. Signals how much leverage from AI vs. labor
  • PLG (Product-Led Growth): Go-to-market model where product sells itself (vs. enterprise sales teams). Cursor/Lovable can stay lean because PLG; Harvey/Sierra need big sales forces because enterprise
  • Colossus 1 & 2: Elon's massive data centers. He spent $20–30B in advance of revenue betting AI would matter. Now selling $24B/year compute to Anthropic and Google
  • Vista playbook: Private equity strategy: buy enterprise software, cut costs, raise prices, harvest inertia customers. Bending Spoons is consumer internet version (Evernote, AOL, Vimeo)
  • Inertia customers: Users who won't churn no matter what (e.g., anyone still on AOL after 26 years). Bending Spoons raises prices 80% knowing these customers won't leave
  • Oligopoly vs. ecosystem: AI market structure question: will foundation models consolidate to 2–3 winners (Anthropic, OpenAI), or will open-source and others create competitive ecosystem? Matters for pricing and innovation
  • Export controls: U.S. restrictions on chip/AI tech to China. Aaron at Perplexity said this hurt U.S. because China innovated on architecture they wouldn't have needed to, building competitive muscle
  • Risk-on: Market sentiment where investors are brave and willing to deploy capital at high valuations. Opposite is 'risk-off' when money gets scared and flees to treasuries

Operator Notes / Why Ken Should Care

  • SpaceX IPO pricing mechanism (fixed vs. discovery) is case study in risk appetite and market timing—relevant for any large exit planning
  • LP expectation recalibration (7–8x returns now routine) directly impacts GP fundraising and founder performance bars
  • Cursor/Lovable efficiency metrics ($3M+ per employee) are new benchmarks for AI-native startups—if you're not targeting $1–2M per head, you're behind
  • Token economics (50–70% of revenue on intelligence) fundamentally change unit economics vs. traditional SaaS—model this in your underwriting
  • Enterprise sales still require bodies (Harvey, Sierra, foundation models will look like Oracle)—don't over-extrapolate PLG lean teams to all B2B
  • Elon's compute play ($24B/year revenue from Anthropic/Google + Cursor backfill) shows vertical integration and capital advantage at work—instructive for infra investing
  • Persistent AI (memory, always-on) will be table stakes within 2 years—if you're building consumer AI, leverage device context; if enterprise, memory is UX and cost win
  • Fintech valuations (Revolut $115B, Ramp $44B) only hold if growth persists—model reversion to financial services multiples (12x earnings) if growth slows
  • Bending Spoons roll-up strategy (buy dying brands, cut costs, raise prices) is consumer version of Vista—if you're in consumer internet M&A, this is playbook to watch
  • Microsoft AI catch-up struggle (models can't even search web) shows how hard it is to close gap to frontier—bet on oligopoly or open-source ecosystem accordingly
  • Rejection and founder grudges are universal—if you're GP or founder, grow thick skin and don't extrapolate individual bad experiences to systemic insight

Watch Map

  • 00:00–08:30: SpaceX IPO mechanics, fixed pricing, 2x book coverage, day-one predictions
  • 08:30–13:00: LP expectations rising to 7–8x returns, Ontario Teachers $10B+ SpaceX gain, bar for founders
  • 13:00–18:00: OpenAI filing to go public, capital needs for foundation models vs. software, Databricks staying private
  • 18:00–24:00: Persistent AI (Dreaming V3), Apple Gemini deal, consumer AI as experiences not productivity
  • 24:00–38:00: Cursor $4B ARR, Lovable $500M ARR with 146 employees, revenue per employee efficiency wars, PLG vs. enterprise sales
  • 38:00–44:00: Elon's Cursor acquisition, $24B/year compute revenue from Anthropic/Google, turning data center risk into win
  • 44:00–52:00: Microsoft launching models that can't search web, catch-up struggle, oligopoly vs. open-source ecosystem question
  • 52:00–58:00: Revolut $115B, Ramp $44B, fintech valuations as financial services adjusted for growth
  • 58:00–1:06:00: Bending Spoons $20B IPO, consumer Vista roll-up (Evernote, AOL, Vimeo), raise prices 80%, harvest inertia customers
  • 1:06:00–1:12:00: Uber cutting 23% of HR, AI disruption in HR, autonomous driving progress in Madrid

Source/Metadata

  • Title: SpaceX Launches Largest Ever IPO | OpenAI Files to Go Public | Uber Cuts 23% of HR
  • Transcript words: 26798
  • Duration seconds: 4556
  • Timestamp note: Timestamps present and used throughout watch_map and key_takeaways
Full transcript 14284 words · 119 min read
0:00

SPEAKER_01

One thing we know about Elon for the last 30 years is when he hears the word more risks, he says, yes, please, I'll have two. I think the IPO nominally will be a dud. I don't think it will trade up dramatically. So what do we have on the cards? SpaceX begins their $75 billion IPO roadshow at a whopping $1.77 trillion valuation. Next, is the future of AI always on as Sam Altman thinks? OpenAI ships Dreaming V3. Next, Apple rebuilds Siri on Google. Thank God, Siri being what it is, is a disgrace as it turns on on my device. And then finally, we have Ramp raising their latest round at $44 billion. There's always money when people aren't afraid. When things get scary, it's not that money runs out. It's that money gets scared. I'm contentious of startups that need to be fat. I'm, what's your excuse? In any business, there's only two things that happen. People are either making stuff or selling stuff. If AOL becomes the next hot thing. These guys are geniuses. Anyone who hasn't churned from AOL now won't churn until they die. Ready to go?

0:04

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_02] Okay, we are back. And what a week it is. We have the largest IPO roadshow in history. We have to start with SpaceX. We're speaking, and this is important to say, Rory's going to have a fit because we're speaking on Tuesday. And obviously, SpaceX is going out on Thursday. And so there is going to be some time discrepancy there. And so what we say will be able to be scrutinized in intense detail by the time you're probably listening.

0:09

SPEAKER_02

[SPEAKER_01] True. To start with the interesting point, one of the things is there's usually two questions you're asking at this point. What's it going to price at and what are you going to trade at? And the funny thing is, unlike 99% of IPOs, the first question's already been answered. Elon has decided that instead of doing price discovery, where the bankers build a book and then they pick the price and they announce the price right at the end, the night before the IPO pricing typically takes place the night before the trade opens. So then everybody gets to buy who participates in the IPO at that price, and then it opens next day at whatever price, up or down from that. In this case, Elon has decided in advance of getting anyone's input that the number should be, I think, 135 bucks a share, which values the company at 1.8 trillion. In other words, he's short-circuited the price discovery process. And instead, we're not doing price discovery. I'm telling you the answer. And the only question is, how much of it do you want to buy at that price?

0:14

SPEAKER_02

[SPEAKER_01] So one thing we can't get wrong is that, Harry. Is that a wise move? He's leaving a lot of room for markets to move in between that. That's why you normally leave it, as close as you can, because you don't want an Iran-Israel, a Broadcom moving markets, and then putting you in a precarious position. It feels unwise, but Elon is a master. So I'm not going to...

0:29

SPEAKER_02

[SPEAKER_01] Yeah, I mean, calling someone unwise is about two days away from becoming a trillionaire is a big call, Harry. But I think what it is, it's no surprise given, it's ballsy. You've got way more error creeping in. You could be wrong to the high, you could be wrong to the low, you could leave money on the table. Maybe on the other hand, you're struggling to get the orders in and it feels very high and it opens down. It's more risk. But the one thing we know about Elon for the last 30 years is when he hears the word more risks, he says, yes, please, I'll have two. And this must appeal to him. It's, I'm telling you the answer in advance and I'm taking the risk. And that's how he became a trillionaire.

0:36

SPEAKER_02

[SPEAKER_00] Is it wise? Well, obviously, it's a huge amount of capital, Rory. But if it's really only 2x subscribed or over... I'm not even sure over-subscribed is the right word if it's only 2x, right? Plus Elon picking the price, that suggests to me it, you know, we'll see. That suggests to me this one won't pop. There's just not a... You know, I do believe the day traders will drive it up ultimately, but it doesn't feel like there's an excessive demand at 2x. In most IPOs, it would be almost insufficient to close the IPO.

0:42

SPEAKER_01

I agree. But there's two separate things in that, Jason. You're right. I mean, one is the decision to pick a fixed price logically reduces the probability of a pop with no other information because the whole point of the banker process is to pick the price the night before that allows the pop next day. And you simply aren't doing that because you don't have the information. You're right. But then the second thing you added is some information that's come out, which is, to date, the book is two times covered. And your comment is that feels low compared to normal IPOs.

0:46

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_00] I mean, traditionally, you want 8 to 10x to get the deal that you want, but you're not raising the vast amounts of capital Elon's raising either.

0:51

SPEAKER_01

Yeah. No, it's hard to get 10x oversubscribed on 75 billion. So yeah, what you're saying is... I mean, to be really direct, what you're saying is you're pricing something on a fixed price that's not taking into account demand, where you're looking for a very large amount of money such that you only have a small amount of coverage. You're right. You look at those circumstances and you say, there's a non-trivial chance that it pops to the downside. Is it 30%? I don't know. But if you think about it, normally bankers bend over backwards to try and have the thing pop, right? So they're trying to get a 10, 15% pop. And near 90% plus of the time it pops, but still 10% of the time it breaks IPO. They get it wrong, right? Even trying to fix the game, they get it wrong. In this case, they're not even trying to fix the game, right? And time will tell on Thursday night, are they too high or too low? But there is obviously by definition, some probably higher than 10% chance that on the day people go, everyone who put in for it, put in for it. And it's not impossible to trade something. It's just, if you use mechanism A that's designed to create a pop and it works 90% of the time, and now you use a mechanism that's designed to, that doesn't have the information to allow you to make a pop because you've done a fixed price, then by definition, the probability of it going wrong goes up. That's all.

0:56

SPEAKER_00

[SPEAKER_01] they're not even trying to fix the game, right? And time will tell on Thursday night, are they too high or too low? But there is obviously by definition, some probably higher than 10% chance that on the day people go, everyone who put in for it, put in for it. And it's not impossible to trade something. It's just, if you use mechanism A that's designed to create a pop and it works 90% of the time, and now you use a mechanism that's designed to be in, that doesn't have the information to allow you to make a pop because you've done a fixed price, then by definition, the probability of it going wrong goes up. That's all.

1:01

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_00] I think what will happen, if that's accurate and 30% to retail, I think the IPO nominally will be a dud. I don't think it will trade up dramatically, but I do think every time there's great news, more satellites in space for SpaceX, more things, it will begin an inexorable rise up. People will be excited, especially if the upside is tied to potentially significant revenue, right, as the last announcements have been with Anthropic and Google. I just don't think it's going to pop that first week. I think there's just not enough buyers out there in this universe, or at least in this galaxy, at this price at 2X. We'll see. I haven't read anything that says those 2X are all 100% binding. I guess if they're all binding every single order, then I guess it would lead to a pop, but typically it's not, right?

1:16

SPEAKER_02

[SPEAKER_01] It is. When you submit an order, you submit an order. [SPEAKER_00] Oh, you're right. Typically, yeah, maybe they'll all get filled. Yeah, they'll all get filled. I have it backwards. Maybe all the orders will get filled.

1:30

SPEAKER_02

[SPEAKER_01] I'm going to step back. I hate that we got into the technicalities of the IPO, because zoom out a million miles here. This is amazing. This is an amazing technical company. It's the iconic company of its generation. It's going to go public this week. It's a huge moment. What do you say to Elon? Congratulations. What do you say, everyone involved? Congratulations. I mean, it's a wildly impressive company. I'm skeptical of the valuation, but step back. I've watched some of the launches on YouTube, and I'm like, the whole thing's so impressive. And at the risk of sounding partisan American, this really is an only in America moment, right? Where you could, who else is going to find the capital to take that kind of risk to go for it, right? And frankly, also to have a big enough capital market to fund it, a big enough addressable market to sell to it. It's a great outcome. It's an amazing company. It's a real asset to America.

1:35

SPEAKER_02

End of day one prediction and end of day 90 prediction.

1:40

SPEAKER_02

[SPEAKER_01] So you really are determined not to let him have his great moment. You just want to see the horse race. You won't talk policies. All you want to talk is the horse race here, Harry, because that's what sells. But to answer, I don't think it's a noble end of day one. I think all three scenarios are equally likely. One third, it goes down just because there's a weird pricing mechanism so they don't have demand. One third, it's flat because whatever. And then one third, to your point, retail enthusiasm, it goes up. There's no information here. Now, I will make a call though. I think over the next 12 months, I doubt it will retain this price. I will make that step. I disagree with Jason. I think fundamental value here reasserts itself. There's two reasons I say that. One is, I always go back to the base rate. The base rate on IPOs in general is you do see quite a lot dip. The base rate on IPO is more than 10x forward sales, even more dip. The base rate on IPO is at 70 times forward sales. There hasn't been any, but you've got to believe there's a dip. So I think valuation reasserts itself over the medium term. And the probability of it being higher than the IPO price 12 months in, in my gut, is lower, significantly lower. So I would say, I haven't a clue day one. It's a tactical thing based on the mechanisms. And I think over the medium term, this amazing company might, shock horror, only be worth one, surely, instead of 1.7. And it's still a huge win.

1:46

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_00] That's what I think. Maybe just two thoughts. One is, listen, there are many great IPOs like Facebook and Google that IPO with a whimper, right? It would not surprise me if this IPO is with a whimper at the end of the day. It doesn't matter for SpaceX. We will have multiple layers of generational wealth created. Elon will get his liquidity, right? It'll all be great, whether it's a nothing burger IPO or not. I guess it might hurt OpenAI the most because they've been so aggressive on their valuations and so aggressive on their capital raise. If that means they have to cut back their aspirations for the amount of capital raise, valuation maybe doesn't matter as much, but they are related. That could be the biggest negative effect. It could take some of the wind out of the sails of OpenAI. The other thing I'll say briefly, I was in Hong Kong as we record this, but before I got on a plane, I spoke to one of my LPs who's getting lots of cash here, got cash in Cerebus, getting cash in all these other deals. And it does tie to a conversation we said before, which is the expectations are so high now for performance. And I think that will permeate through the ecosystem. I do think it's a minor negative, but I do think it's something for founders and others to understand that it's not a free lunch, right? The bar will continue to go up after these events. When LPs are looking for seven to eight X routinely from GPs, which is hard to do, right, outside of anomalous periods of time, the expectations that GPs will have from founders continues to go up. And as this LP said to me,

1:51

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_00] got cash in Cerebus, getting cash in all these other deals. And it does tie to a conversation we said before, which is the expectations are so high now for performance. And I think that will permeate through the ecosystem. And again, I think it's a minor negative, but I do think it's something for founders and others to understand that it's not a free lunch, right? The bar will continue to go up after these events. When LPs are looking for seven to eight X routinely from GPs, which is hard to do, right? Outside of anomalous periods of time, the expectations that GPs will have from founders continues to go up. And as this LP said to me, I don't know that little five to eight billion dollar IPOs really make this math work anymore, right? And so we've talked about it, but to hear it from a large LP, it echoed in my ears of how the bar goes up.

1:56

SPEAKER_01

I don't think you can take a once in a decade event and start extrapolating it as a norm. I think in life, you should take this as the once in a decade. [SPEAKER_00] But there are four or five of these once in a decade events. There's going to be Anthropic, OpenAI, SpaceX. It's interesting that you say that, but of course, the opportunity, the once in a decade, I mean, SpaceX was once in a decade. It was last decade. Reminder here, founders wrote that check in 2008, but it's now 2024. It's 16 years ago, right? So for that kind of huge return, I mean, yes, there's been a 10X since then. [SPEAKER_00] When was the Cursor C check written again? Remind me.

2:20

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_00] Four years ago. [SPEAKER_00] The Cursor C check three years ago, yes. [SPEAKER_00] Yeah. [SPEAKER_00] So maybe they do happen more than once a decade.

2:43

SPEAKER_01

There they seem to be. I think you're going to have one trillion dollar outcome from the last decade and two, it looks like from this decade, if it all happens according to plan. But my point is, yes, you probably can't assume 10X. You don't run your business on the expectation that every check you write is going to be a trillion dollar outcome. If you're really smart and you get one, you should say, yay. Right? So I think eight billion dollar outcomes will make everyone perfectly happy. Obviously, unless you have a ten billion dollar fund, in which case it doesn't. I mean, that's why fund size, the amount of, fund size dictates the level of the amount of market cap it takes. It's a Josh comment thing from ages ago. You know, the venture arrogance index, whatever. Right? The bigger the fund, the bigger the deal that has to be to make it work. There's nothing surprising here.

2:46

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_02] Will this have knock on effects in terms of LPs direct investing more and see an increase in fund investments from LPs? You've got Ontario Teachers who will make, I think, over ten billion dollars from their SpaceX.

2:50

SPEAKER_02

[SPEAKER_01] Will Barron, Ph.D.: To clarify, I know you think the entire Midwest is the same, Harry, but I think it's Ontario Teachers. Right? [SPEAKER_01] Will Barron, Ph.D.: Fair enough. [SPEAKER_01] Will Barron, Ph.D.: But now, at this point, you're conflating Canada and America, which is an easy mistake to make because we're making it ourselves, starting with the president. And it does begin with O and it's in the middle. So I understand your ignorance. But let's go back to— [SPEAKER_00] Will Barron, Ph.D.: Maybe he's just a big Fallout player too.

3:08

SPEAKER_01

Will Barron, Ph.D.: Easy. But the bottom line is, yes, Ontario Pension nailed it. I mean, they're going to make a magnificent return. And there's a bunch of others. It's great. University of Washington, they have an extremely savvy CIO who, and by the way, Washington, Harry, just to confuse you further, is not in either Washington state or Washington city, but we'll keep that for now. But yeah, look, by definition, these are going to be the best co-investments ever because it's the best deal ever. I mean, there's nothing surprising in it. I know some of our RLPs—

3:14

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_02] Will Barron, Ph.D.: RLP is going to come back and go, those that will get liquidity from this, go, hey, we're going to reinvest more— Of course they are. [SPEAKER_02] RLP D.: Of course they are. [SPEAKER_02] RLP D.: And will all that brethren be like, hey, we're going to join this because we want the next generation, even if we didn't have them.

3:33

SPEAKER_01

RLP D.: Yes, because everyone's just going to go, wow, that looks amazing. As I say, again, it's back to the extrapolation from the unique event. Of course they are, because it is going to be amazing. I saw, I think in a journal this morning, I think this is Washington University. Again, I'm not going to confuse it. It's 10 or 15% of their endowment. It's awesome. It's awesome. Right? Yes, this is the best venture capital deal ever in terms of absolute return. And yeah, anyone involved is going to do really well. And even if it has a dip in price, they're going to do extraordinarily well.

3:39

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_02] RLP D.: Speaking of a once in a lifetime or once in a decade moment, as Roy very articulately put, another once in a decade moment is obviously OpenAI filing to go public. Not so confidentially. Anything to say here that we haven't covered? Rory D.: The only thing I don't understand is maybe it's a question for Rory, because I don't get it. Other than the captain obvious element, what's the point of hedging your bet on the timing, but filing? I mostly get it, but I don't totally get it. Right?

3:43

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_00] I only have to get this. Oh, we may want to stay private. We want flexibility, but we're going public. Rory D.: I think it's actually all they're doing is being smart and managing expectations finally. Right? Which is, I read that as we're finally to go public. In a perfect world, we'd love to go public as quickly as we can. But if it's delayed, for whatever reason, we don't want to have a whole bunch of negative stories there and that says, see it slipping. So if you preemptively say, manage expectations and say, we're filing, but we're not committing to a timeline, we're not all going to be sitting here in late October going, they said they'd be going public in early November, what is going on. The big aha here, and we said it two weeks ago, it's everyone's suddenly gunning for the door. At some point, you need the capital markets, the public capital markets, because the scale involved is such that that's where you have to go. And if everyone's just hit that point, they're going for it.

3:48

SPEAKER_00

[SPEAKER_01] For whatever reason, we don't want to have a whole bunch of negative stories there and that says, see it slipping. So if you preemptively say, manage expectations and say, we're filing, but we're not committing to a timeline, we're not all going to be sitting here in late October going, they said they'd be going public in early November, WTF is going on. The big aha here, and we said it two weeks ago, it's everyone's suddenly gunning for the door. At some point, you need the capital markets, the public capital markets, because the scale involved is such that that's where you got to go. And if everyone's just hit that point, they're going for it. I think going back to your comment earlier on this SpaceX, it feels like the market is very risk on. I mean, we had that little dip last week and then everyone got over it in two days. So it's as good a time as any. There's no obvious. You keep cranking while you can and see if you can get it done. I mean, I'm sure that they made that caveat of, we'll take our time, but they made that statement in the press department. My guess is in finance and legal, the mandate is get this puppy done as quickly as possible. So we have maximum optionality. Right. And so that with the SEC, and we're pointing out, by the way, the SpaceX S1 went through the SEC very quickly. And normally that's, I mean, I remember when that used to be a painful process with multiple iterations and it seemed to happen here extraordinarily quickly, probably because we don't regulate anything anymore. So go team. So, you know, this may all process through real quickly, in which case, brace yourself for a fun fall.

3:55

SPEAKER_00

[SPEAKER_02] Rory's on fire this morning. Gosh, I really want to touch on something beneath the product layer for OpenAI, which is, you know, Sam Altman's been driving towards persistent and always on AI. They shipped Dreaming V3, biggest memory architecture upgrade since launch. I'm just intrigued, Jason, in particular to hear your thoughts on this. Is the future of AI continuous, persistent, 24 hours a day, fabric of life always on in your mind? And how do you see this and that?

4:00

SPEAKER_00

I think we all believe it. I think that, and I mean, we can make fun of Apple this week, repackaging Gemini and giving up on AI, right? If that's the way we want to view it. But that's a little piece of wanting ultimately AI to be persistent 24-7. We do want this. We already live little hints of it. And it's pretty silly that AI, for the most part, lives in our browser, right? This, which is, if you think about it, very dated. I mean, it's so dated that we still use browsers. I mean, who would have thought. We got to get Marc André. I mean, the fact that we still live in the era of Netscape in so many ways. So I do think it's exciting. I do think as this show continues, the token apocalypse, I think it will morph into just standard business practice, right? At some point, there's only so large IT budgets can be. There's only so much, even if we lay off half of employment, I mean, employment keeps growing. We're going to have to manage spend. So I do think we're going to look back in two years and think of this non-persistent AI as almost archaic, right? As almost desktop-like.

4:07

SPEAKER_00

[SPEAKER_01] Yeah. I mean, you've thrown a lot there. We've pulled several faces there for the audience listening. Rory's facial. No, no, no. It's just that Jason, as he often does, covered a lot of different things. And I'm just processing through it more slowly. On that, on the memory thing, I'm kind of with Jason is that it just totally makes sense, right? And the question, yeah, if you step back, you know, you have the core models and then you have what people are calling all the harness, which is all the stuff around it to make those models effective. And part of that, and it can either be in them, it should be in the model or it could in theory be in the harness, is just understanding memory so that you could, and the impact of that. And I think why Jason went to the token economics part of it is part of the thing should be, you should get better answers with memory. And part of the thing, it should be more cost effective in terms of token, because you're not passing through all the context all the time. You can perhaps, it's part of it. I mean, I think a lot of the trend on this harnesses will be adding stuff to minimize your cost on frontier models. And part of that will be having memory, right? It also leads to a better experience, right? I think that I actually just went in and tried to see, have it been switched on in mine yet? Because it just makes a ton of sense. You should know who I am after I look up 58, 20 VC podcasts. You know, I'm probably here to look at my 20 VC podcast researcher guys. So it just makes a ton of sense.

4:12

SPEAKER_00

[SPEAKER_02] Right. Most people know who you are now. [SPEAKER_01] No, I'm sure. But my OpenAI sometimes doesn't. So yeah, it's a really, it's absolutely one of the necessary to do's and they're doing it. That's great. And I just went to each other.

4:29

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_02] Well, you pulled a face when Jason said about Apple giving up on AI with Gemini. You're right there.

4:37

SPEAKER_01

You're moving on to that. That was an interesting one. Ben Thompson and Stratechery did a really good piece on it this morning I was reading. Is that, I think, to some extent, they're giving in the sense that they're paying Google a billion dollars to use their model as the default model. But reminder, Google pays them, I think, 12 or 20, I used to know the number, 20 billion dollars to be the default search engine. And so it's a minor asset. I give them credit. I actually think that they're making some progress. Yes, it would be better if they'd had their own model, but they're making progress on the use cases that just make a ton of sense for the consumer. And I think it was, I think the amount of context you have when you're on someone's phone is such a, they can, they should be able to deliver a unique and compelling consumer experience for the kind of things they demoed on the thing about knowing context on which Rory. It's like your memory comment, Jason. It's like knowing which Rory Harry's talking about, knowing your calendar, knowing everything and deliver a much better experience. Now, should they have been able to do it with their own model? Yeah. But the bottom line is they control the handset and for the consumer,

4:42

SPEAKER_01

on the use cases that just make a ton of sense for the consumer. And I think the amount of context you have when you're on someone's phone is such that they should be able to deliver a unique and compelling consumer experience for the kind of things they demoed on, about knowing context on which Rory. It's like your memory comment, Jason, it's like knowing which Rory Harry's talking about, knowing your calendar, knowing everything and deliver a much better experience. Now, should they have been able to do it with their own model? Yeah. But the bottom line is they control the handset and for the consumer, it's a pretty powerful product. So I think they're in a good position to make progress. I don't think they're giving up. I actually think they're pragmatically saying, we kind of screwed up and not have our own model, but that's actually not what matters for us, for Apple. What matters for Apple is delivering an amazing experience to our consumers. Because if we do that, they'll keep buying handsets. And if we keep buying handsets, we can probably afford to give someone a billion bucks a year, right? So I give them credit for getting their act together. I mean, it is stunning that Siri is so bad for so long. So I think actually trying to fix it is just awesome. So I give them credit for stepping in the right direction. That's my takeaway from it. So the opposite, I don't think they've given up. I think they're doing what it takes to win coming from behind. And they have a great position. I mean, it's interesting. The person you have to think about this a lot with obviously is if you're OpenAI versus if you're on Anthropic, because then Anthropic has made the enterprise bet and OpenAI in part has made the consumer bet. And I like my OpenAI subscription because I sit at my desk and I do research, but for a lot, I mean, it was a great line and give Ben Thompson credit. He said very clearly. I've thought it, but I hadn't heard anyone say it clear. He said, consumers don't want to work. There's not a big market for consumers in their non-working life to do a whole bunch of complex research or using AI for productivity. They just want delightful experiences because they want to relax and entertain. So I think actually, the consumer space is going to be a tougher space for OpenAI. The enterprise space has really been validated because an enterprise is all about automation efficiency and consumer space. It's about experiences. Apple's well-placed to do that. OpenAI has got to compete with that and compete with Google. And it's a tough space, especially if Apple's getting their act together.

4:47

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_02] Well, speaking of consumers not wanting to work soon, they won't have to. Uber cuts 23% of HR. HR. Just to make Jason happy. We can now have Jason. [SPEAKER_02] Sorry. I'm so sorry. Obviously it's people losing jobs. It's terribly sad, but I'm the one who said no great CEO likes HR and everyone got angry at me. And then everyone starts cutting HR. Anything of note here from Uber cutting 23% of HR, remote work rescinded, three-day in-office mandate company denies AI played a role despite 95% of engineers using it daily. Anything of note there?

4:59

SPEAKER_00

Well, look, HR and recruiting, right? Let's consider them different are the easiest things to cut, right? They're there. Recruiting is all, you know, you always see any big tech leader stumble a little bit and they lay off 30% of the recruiting department. We're going to, you often want them back. I always wonder, I always think this is a, I mean, it makes sense on paper, right? The HR one will be interesting. I mean, we've put out a call for someone to report to our AI VP of marketing, and I've gotten my head cut off a lot on social media for that by people not really listening to what I'm saying about that. But I do think HR is one of these areas that in many parts of it will be better managed by AI. I think an AI can be a better VP of HR for certain parts of the job than a biased human. I think there are advantages to having an AI VP of HR. I don't want to get rid of all of the humans or even lay people off, but an AI VP of HR can evaluate every single thing you've ever done. Every little bit of your work, all of your issues, whether an AI VP of HR can figure out, hey, maybe it really is your idiot boss, Jason, you know, maybe that really is the problem. It's not you. An AI VP of HR can find out a lot of things and process a lot. So I don't think it's an under-discussed area versus other areas, but it should be massively disrupted. The big picture question in all these areas is, how much efficiency do you get? My God, 23%. I doubt everyone is automating and saving 23% using AI in the non-engineering departments because adoption there isn't as strong as engineering. Do I think there's some? Of course I do. So my bottom line is, I think my guess is some portion of this is automation. I doubt it's 20% because I'm always calibrating off what is, I mean, it's the Dario number, what percentage of knowledge work is going to be automated and it's knowledge work tasks and knowledge jobs. Is it five? Is it 10? Is it 50? As Dario has said, 23% felt like a lot, but whatever. Again, what you don't know is how much of it is just too many folks there and they're just rationalizing. So it's a data point. I mean, I think the other data point from Uber is far more interesting, right? Which is not the AI for HR, but the AI for autonomous driving that they continue to make progress on autonomous driving. Which stat was that, Rory?

5:03

SPEAKER_00

[SPEAKER_01] No, that's the one you mentioned. I'm sorry, you made a point there that they're actually rolling out some more autonomous driving experience in Europe, in Madrid, I think. Right. So they're kind of partnering with, I think it's Waymo, some of the technology providers, but it's the big, I mean, if you want to talk automation, driving is one of the biggest targets in terms of the number of humans that do that job. And when you see Uber making experimental progress on robot taxi in Europe, it's something obviously to keep an eye on. It's worth pointing out this stuff is still moving way slower than I think people anticipated. It hasn't been

5:07

SPEAKER_01

they're actually rolling out some more autonomous driving experience in Europe, in Madrid, I think. Right. So, and they're partnering with, I think it's WeRider, some of the technology providers, but it's the big thing. If you want to talk automation, driving is one of the biggest targets in terms of the number of humans that do that job. And when you see Uber making experimental progress on robot taxi in Europe, it's something obviously to keep an eye on. It's worth pointing out this stuff is still moving way slower than I think people anticipated. It hasn't been Waymo in San Francisco resulting in Waymo everywhere within six months. It's been a long, steady progress for Waymo and Uber's doing what it should do, which is this is existential. The Travis Kalanick devotees would say the failure, the cutting of their autonomous project in 2016 or 17 was a fatal error for Uber. I'm not sure. I think 10 years later, they can pick up the thread and catch up on that because it's not like the technology tips like a domino, but I think they're smart to now start pushing robotaxis and partnering with technology providers. And this is because the question on the Uber stock is always, oh my God, is robotaxi existential, which is a bad scenario, or the good scenario is lots of people build robotaxi technology and Uber is in a wonderful position to be the coordinating thing because it's the app we use. And if they just add 10,000 robotaxis to the fleet, then things continue just fine. And frankly, it's good to see the Europeans do something. I mean, I said this respectfully, Harry, but typically Europe is the slow technical laggard, especially on stuff like that. So go Madrid.

5:14

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_02] David Shepard [SPEAKER_02] Should we discuss the Revolut 115 billion? 115 billion. Amazing. David Shepard [SPEAKER_02] Yeah, thank you. David Shepard I think you're doing that. I'm going to push it. I think you're doing that defensively. You felt I was dissing on you in Europe and you're basically implicitly saying, oh, look at Revolut. It's amazing. Correct? David Shepard Correct. David Shepard

6:10

SPEAKER_01

And it is amazing. And you know why it exists? Because the European banks, unlike the American banks in general, are so crappy. There's a reason that Revolut's worth 115 billion because the incumbent European banks were fat, dumb, and happy and making margin off their customers. And there's a reason why Chime is worth 5 billion, still a great outcome, by the way. That's because the US banks are now a little more efficient. David Shepard David Shepard

6:30

SPEAKER_01

That's also why Newbank is such a valuable business. Because the Brazilian banks were inefficient. I think all these fintechs, they can be a proven market. It's a function of how egregiously priced the incumbents are. And Europe, especially when it had non-single currency, you had all this foreign exchange. Because you guys aren't in Europe, you had the FX chargers, you had all this transporter nonsense. And Revolut just blew a hole in that. So I think it's amazing. And I know you're a big fan of the CEO. And I think it's great. I wish him all the best and pound those old school European banks into the dirt. I mean, at some point, we're going to have to deal with the fact that the largest bank by market cap doesn't do much lending. And that's actually going to be a real problem in the aggregate. Because the whole point of banking is to recycle savings into lending. And right now, Revolut is not a long term lender, but that's by the by. They're killing it.

6:36

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_02] David I'm fascinated to hear Jason's thoughts on this one. What's dominated my Twitter over the last week is Greg Eisenberg's original tweet about a horror story of venture fund raise. It led to a slew, hundreds and hundreds of founders sharing horror stories, including the Cloudflare CEO, who said about his experience with Khosla and Vinod Khosla. Jason, I'm really intrigued to hear your thoughts on this one. I'm sure you have some. How did you feel about this slew of founders bluntly saying how terrible a VC experience they had in certain cases?

6:39

SPEAKER_00

Well, I'd say a couple things. First of all, I have as when I was in the most intense phase of founder, I had those stories too. I really we forget how deep some of these things cut, these slights. The folks that are friends of ours now, that we co-invest with, I thought terrible things of at the time, literally. One that we both know really well would constantly use me just to do diligence on another investment constantly. And now I'm pretty zen about that. The founders, I'm saying just take the meeting and do reverse intel. If you're just being used for a competitor, then sit down with him and just find out about your competitor, get the exact information. But man, that stuff really burned me. And founders hold grudges. So a couple of things, first of all, the whole thing with the CEO of Cloudflare, just remember founders hold grudges. I still do. I'm just getting over them now. I'm just getting over my founder grudges. So founders hold grudges in a way that VCs actually, I think don't because VCs, you miss the deal. You got to find another bus, right? Having said all that, get over it because it's sales. The only thing that to really have a grudge, a true grudge on is if you got fired. Okay. That one, I think the folks that hate Benchmark from Uber, I think they deserve to hate Benchmark. I think there's others, but if you're treated poorly during the fundraising, get over it, it's sales. Have you never sold? This is what I say to people. Have you never sold anything? Have you ever not thought a customer deal was going to close and it didn't? Have you ever not talked to a prospect where they told you, Rory, of course we're going to buy by the end of the quarter. And then you just send them 28 emails and 87 texts and the deal never closes. How is it any different selling stock than anything else? So there's a bunch of issues to separate the grudge, the firing, which is a niche issue, and learn to sell, man, grow some. In one sense, you're right, Jason. But I think the difference for the founder, and I think a ton of what you said, super insightful. The difference is

6:47

SPEAKER_00

I say to people, have you never sold anything? Have you ever thought a customer deal was going to close and it didn't? Have you ever not talked to a prospect where they told you, Rory, of course we're going to buy by the end of the quarter, and then you just send them 28 emails and 87 texts and the deal never closes. How is it any different selling stock than anything else? So there's a bunch of issues to separate the grudge, the firing, which is a niche issue, and learn to sell, but grow some.

6:53

SPEAKER_00

[SPEAKER_01] In one sense, you're right, Jason. But I think the difference for the founder, and I think a ton of what you said is super insightful. The difference is the founder in this case isn't selling their product. They're selling themselves. So I think you're right about one thing, the rejections cut deeper, right? And there's no doubt. Even on my side, I remember a VC 30 years ago said to me, you never forget the LP turndowns. And 30 years later, he's so right. You remember those people who turned you down. It's just a personal thing because you're not just selling your product. You're not selling Ford cars on the deal. You're selling yourself. And when you get turned down, it hurts. So I totally with you, Jason, is that you do have to grow a pair. You do have to get a thick skin. But I totally get why founders, even if nothing goes wrong in the process, I totally get it. Rejection sucks, right? And as yet, so that's the founder side. And I thought you were super sympathetic there. And then just to put the other side of the table, every venture person is in a business where we turn down 99 out of 100 deals that we look at. So rejection is our default MO. And that's why I always wrestle with these ratings businesses, right? The kind of rating VCs. It's doable. And I think there actually are appropriate ways to do it. But you do have to remember that the default is a no. And it's really hard to high customer sat when 99 times out of 100, you're going to tell the customer no. It's why no one ever loves the bank that they apply to for lending money. Because a well-run bank turns down five out of six customers. No one likes that experience. Rejection sucks, right? So it's set up for failure out of the gate. Sometimes, in the course of turning down two, three hundred people a year, you get some stuff wrong. What was interesting is Matthew was really upset that Vinod asked him to consider getting rid of Michelle, who we know is great and his CTO, and giving him the shares, not stealing his shares, which I think was misinterpreted. He made a suggestion in a pitch. And listen, I'm a super fan of Michelle. I would not make that suggestion. But let's step back for a minute. We've all had those meetings with founders where the team is very unbalanced. And would I, am I the node? And would I say it that way? No, but you might know me well enough. I almost would, in a different situation. I almost would say that to a founder. I just wouldn't do it during a pitch. I would just say it's not a fit for me. But I find myself constantly post-investing being the only one that would say things, you know, what are you going to do with your co-founder? And she's just not committed enough. He's not getting it done. And so I think his directness is interesting that it bothered the CEO of Cloudflare so much. But in a way, it was just his read of the team. I think it was wrong, at least for one of them, but the read of the team.

7:00

SPEAKER_00

[SPEAKER_01] And by wrong, you mean incorrect relative to the subsequent outcome, right? Well, I would, I know Michelle, I don't know Michelle that well. I think she's a great founder. So I would keep her. But the fact that VCs go in and you see that the founders are not equal in terms of their commitment and skill set, right?

7:09

SPEAKER_00

[SPEAKER_01] I mean, look, I don't comment on this because look, it's clear, given the superb outcome, that whatever Cloudflare had, it shouldn't have been touched one little bit. It should have just been let do exactly what it did. It's a great outcome. So you're right. I think, again, Jason, you raise a good point. You go in, you know, you see things and especially at the earliest stages, if you think the team is wrong, but you want to do the deal, then, you know, that's a really tricky conversation, right? And you should be aware of having, and I think just as well as when you're as successful as Vinod, you're like, I could take three meetings and slowly and delicately get to this point, or maybe I'll just say it. Now, it's also worth pointing out, he said very clearly, he doesn't believe that happened. So I think, you know, I think stepping back, I don't know if it's a useful way to rehash. I mean, the more successful you are, the more meetings you'll have, the more meetings you have, the more likely some of them go wrong, especially if you're direct and Vinod is nothing if not direct. So stuff happens. I mean, as someone pointed out, he was on the Juniper list, he was on the Midas list the first time for Juniper and he's on the Midas list this year for OpenAI. And there's 30 years between those two events. So he must be doing something right overall. But we just still have to say that on an individual day, you can piss people off. And look, I'm sure I look back across 300, 400 turn downs a year for 30 years. I know there's been some where I wish I'd handled it differently. There's been one or two at the term sheet level. I wish I'd handled it differently. It happens. It's not ideal. You know, if you're aware of it, you apologize later and say, look, I got that wrong. And you just have to move on. Some element of breakage is inevitable.

7:12

SPEAKER_00

[SPEAKER_02] I have to admit, Rory, I disagree with you. [SPEAKER_02] What? [SPEAKER_02] I've been turned down by lots of LPs. The best way to have revenge is that you forget they even existed. I'm being a dick here, but a lot of them ping me now. I'm like, wow. And when they turned me down when I was 21, I'm like, whoa. And you're like, who are you?

7:31

SPEAKER_00

[SPEAKER_01] Yeah, maybe early on, you early on, you remember you're right over time to Jason's point, you developed a thick skin and you're right. I remember much less the turn downs on fund seven than on fund one. Yeah, the first one was fun. So I do remember on fund three, our first independent fund, which we foolishly timed literally for the week of the great financial crisis in November 08, getting turned down.

7:34

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_02] existed. I'm being a dick here, but a lot of them ping me now. I'm like, wow. And when they turned me down when I was 21, I'm like, whoa. And you're like, who are you?

7:37

SPEAKER_00

[SPEAKER_01] Yeah, maybe early on, you remember you're right over time to Jason's point, you developed a thick skin and you're right. I remember much less the turn downs on fund seven than on fund one. Yeah, the first one was fun. So I do remember on fund three, our first independent fund, which we foolishly timed literally for the week of the great financial crisis in November 08, getting turned down three times in the space of an hour. So I do remember that pretty vividly, but life goes on.

7:39

SPEAKER_00

[SPEAKER_02] Okay. So again, big milestones for Lovable and Cursor this week. Lovable, so literally just before we came on, Lovable hit 500 million of ARR. The number was wrong. So 500 million of ARR with 146 employees. Cursor has hit 4 billion and it's targeting 6 billion at the end of the year. Jason, you're the man of the hour for this one. You're the coder. Any thoughts on this? This was unprecedented.

7:40

SPEAKER_00

Listen, I think there's two different things you said. One was about the scale, right, of these companies, right? Which we've talked, I do think the headcount thing is something that we're still learning about, right? And so I think when we started this show, we were in an area where folks were very lean and growing very quickly. But the question was, does this normalize over time? As you approach scale, as you approach 100 million, 200 million, 500 million, a billion in revenue, will startups get fat again, right? Do you just need these layers? And I can think of a number of hot AI startups that are getting pretty fat, especially on go-to-market teams and others, but we're seeing more and more examples to the contrary. And it is disruptive on many levels if you can stay as efficient as these guys are. It is disruptive to investing. It is disruptive to employees because it will shrink the number of these great roles and it will increase compensation, right? To the Click-Up point, to Zeb's point, I'm doing layoffs to give million dollars to a handful of folks. Lovable can pay its team whatever it wants, right? With less than 200 employees, it can pay whatever it wants. But man, if this becomes the steady state for startups, and maybe it was in the old days, maybe in the old days of Microsoft it was true, but it's just so different if they're not going to reflate, is what I think about. Because it's not a lot of people, man. And what people don't understand, I know Replit a little bit of Lovable, but they're the same. They're pushing out a lot of code. One thing you could say is, oh, it's easy because they only have one product, right? That would be a comeback that I think a little bit like, you don't have to have 22 products like Datadog or 7000 like Salesforce. Well, maybe, but these are pretty complicated products, okay? You've got database, you've got hosting, you've got management, you've got SEO you're running. These guys are pushed because it's the most brutally competitive space it is. They're pushing out more features than any of us did our entire lifetimes a generation ago. So I don't think these folks are working, they're incredibly hard and they're incredibly productive. So I did almost, and if you want to be, you want to have some contempt for VCs tying this together, I'm kind of contentious of startups that need to be fat. I'm like, what's your excuse? What do you need another 200 people for? And when I'm at a board meeting and a VP says, or they're all C levels now, right? A C of something. There's no VPs anymore in startups. They're all Cs. And they say, well, I could do that, but I need another 50 or 100 heads. I need another 10 or 20 or 40 million. I just think that person should go.

7:42

SPEAKER_01

The only comment on, and first of all, broadly agree, but the only pushback I'll make is this, right? We're having the, oh, they're amazing that they can do this with only 146 heads. But remember, if you're spending 50 to 70% of your revenue on intelligence from Anthropic or OpenAI, you don't have the, I mean, it's a different business, right? You don't have the option to also have 50 to 70% of your revenue on employees because there's not enough room in the percentages, right? So there's some, I mean, they're just different businesses with different business models, right? [SPEAKER_00] They are, but you have the choice of who you invest in or who you work for, right?

7:53

SPEAKER_01

We have our legs in pocketbooks, right? No, of course. And this is actually one of the core challenges many of these other companies are going to have. If you can be one of the 146 employees, that is, I agree with you, Jason, 100%, that is getting levered from this AI such that your economics are compelling because you're one of a small group of people making a lot of money in a business that's leveraging technology to have a very high revenue per headcount. It means we can pay you a lot. That's a far better place to be as an employee, you're right, than, you know, one of, yeah, 18, whatever it is, 90,000 employees at Salesforce. You're exactly right because you're not getting levered from the models and intelligence, right? And this is the, how much will be labor and how much will be intelligence? This is the question of what's the split and what you're seeing to your point. I'm sorry, I'm rambling on this, but it's clear in my head. I want to get it across. In businesses that are using a lot of intelligence and I'm using tokens as a proxy for that, then small numbers of people can achieve a lot and make a lot. And those are better places to be as an employee and often as an investor, right? Yeah. Then to be, you know, slogging it out with 10 times the employees, not a ton of new leverage from AI. And yeah, you're stuck in 2010's ground game. Which sucks. That's what you'd want to do if you could as a founder, as an employee, as an investor, you'd want that all, if you could, that's the model you'd want. That's where I'd want to go work. I want to go work somewhere where I'm empowered, where I'm one of 172 people at 500 million in revenue. I matter. To your point, Jason, I do think, and I want to call it out. I do think as you start to develop an enterprise motion and you implicitly said it, you're probably talking about the foundation models who are building big go to market machines, because they have to, we are going to see way more bodies. I don't buy, there's not going to be

7:57

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_00] employee, as an investor, you'd want that all, if you could, that's the model you'd want. That's where I'd want to go work. I want to go work somewhere where I'm empowered, where I'm one of 172 people at 500 million in revenue. I matter. To your point, Jason, I do think, and I want to call it out. I do think as you start to develop an enterprise motion and you implicitly said it, you're probably talking about the foundation models who are building big go to market machines, because they have to, we are going to see way more bodies. I don't buy there's not going to be an infinite number of— Oh, worry, I hate that. It's not just, I mean, it's Lagorre, it's Harvey, it's your Sierras. When you're selling to enterprise, this idea that 157 people can do it on their own is not going to be true. I think for products, because remember, in the end of the day, someone wants to— It's not that it— Hang on, agree. In any business, there's only two things that happen. People are either making stuff or selling stuff. If they're not doing any of those two things, they're just overhead. To your point, if you're selling stuff via PLG, then you only need people to make stuff, so you can be pretty lean. Once you start selling to, as you say, to law firms, once you start selling to corporates, then you do end up with a big sales force. One of my theories is that that doesn't change from cycle to cycle. The enterprise sales force in five years will look like the Oracle sales force, the Microsoft sales force, and the IBM sales force 50 years ago. Because—

8:02

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_00] But here's the thing. I don't know that that's going to be true, Rory. First of all, I don't mean to go back to the law. If we compare Replit and Lovable, I know Replit's hiring 250 sales reps this year. So that's going to look very much like a traditional organization. Lovable isn't, okay? And it's different DNAs and different goals. And the majority of Anthropic's enterprise sales are not allowed to talk to a human. And so my point from that, we can't all be Anthropic. Founders are choosing, they are choosing to have leaner go-to-market teams, leaner sales. They just don't want this crap. They just don't want 250 people running around. And they're willing to trade off some marginal revenue. I mean, Anthropic has less than 5,000 employees, right? So they're just saying culturally. And so I don't think that they're all going to, I thought they would all look like SAP and Oracle and Salesforce. We're not seeing that. We're not seeing that. We're seeing something in the middle where they still want to be lean.

8:02

SPEAKER_01

It's not going to be 147 people doing 500 million when it's enterprise sales. [SPEAKER_00] But what you might see is three to two to five times the level of efficiency. And it just changes the culture, the head counts where people are. That's the difference, right? It doesn't really matter whether it's zero or four X, right?

8:08

SPEAKER_01

I agree. It will be better. No matter what happens, when you start with a clean slate and leveraging intelligence, you just become way more efficient. I agree. These companies, on average, will be way more efficient. When you do a comparison, it's over 3 million an hour per head versus, and I'm not, but a Salesforce, which is 350K per head. It's nine times more efficient. Yeah. But again, I'm just going to say it here. Yes, you're true. But Salesforce, enterprise heavy, R and D heavy, no intelligence costs, right? Remember, they have 300 million of, they just said it of tokens, which let's just do it here. We did the math. That's roughly 10 or 15 grand per engineer and engineers are about only one fifth of what they have. So remember that 300,000 ARR, probably only 1% of that is tokens. Do you understand me, Harry? In other words, Salesforce has $300,000 of revenue per head, which means if they're going to make money, they can't pay anyone more than 200,000, right? And they're probably spending 1% of revenue per head on tokens. Contrast that with your example of Replet. They're getting 2.3 million per head, but they're probably spending 70% of dollars on tokens. It's just vastly different businesses. And one of them is more aggressively leveraging the new enabling technology. So to Jason's point, it's probably a sweeter spot to be one of the 147 people in that gig than one of the, I used to know the head count. Now I don't, I probably could do it by math, that 20, 30,000 people in a much larger organization where you don't have leverage. They're just different businesses. But this is, to me, this is much more interesting than layoffs in these stories. I think everybody, every founder, forget about older companies, every founder today wants to run a startup that's at least a million in revenue per employee or more. They're targeting 2 million. They want to be in a million, and they want it because they want great teams. They want lean teams. They want the best people. They want to work this way. They want to go to work with people they look up to and respect. They so I, my sense is that roughly over the coming years, startups will be half the size that they used to be for revenue, including enterprise. This is very much B2B focused. And that's a big, that's a much bigger change than whether this company does a 10 or 15% layoff. If everyone's half the size they used to be, it's a much bigger change.

8:13

SPEAKER_01

By definition, if you invent something that's meant to augment humans and make them more efficient, and that thing is called AI and it does a trillion in revenue, by definition, you need to see a trillion of efficiencies. And the way efficiencies show up is less humans per unit of task. You're exactly right. That's the bet. If it wasn't happening, the entire thesis of the case would be bullshit. So you're right, Jason, it's gotta be happening. If the people who sell AI can't be efficient with AI, then what chance is there for the rest of them? Do I agree with you?

8:18

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_02] David Morgan Did Elon have the acquisition of the year buying Cursor for what will be 10 times end of year revenue? It looks a pretty prescient buy if they're going to hit target. Jason It looks pretty clever. I mean, I think what we talked about, it was a clever deal on every dimension. I mean, when I was thinking about this, because I'm always skeptical on the valuation, but Elon did such an amazing job of meeting the AI moment. And let me tell you what I mean by that. It's like, you know, you look back and you go, he obviously founded OpenAI and then all the drama happened, blah, blah, blah. But in the last 24 months,

8:23

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_02] David Morgan Did Elon have the acquisition of the year buying Cursor for what will be 10 times end of year revenue? It looks pretty prescient if they're going to hit target.

8:27

SPEAKER_01

Jason It looks pretty clever. I think what we talked about, it was a clever deal on every dimension. When I was thinking about this, because I'm always skeptical on the valuation, but Elon did such an amazing job of meeting the AI moment. Let me tell you what I mean by that. You look back and you go, he obviously founded OpenAI and then all the drama happened. But in the last 24 months, he moved from ground zero to building Colossus, building Colossus 2, dealing with his model. But just because he had the guts to show up and spend that kind of money, because to be fair, he does have the cheapest cost of capital on the planet. He found himself with gigawatts of capacity just when everyone needed it, was able to sell it to them, and then did the Cursor deal also to kind of backfill the space. Everything stems from the fact that he had the big picture conviction that AI mattered and he was willing to put 20 to 30 billion dollars of capital in the ground in advance of revenue because he felt this was the trend to back. And at least right now, it looks like a great trend. You're right, prescient is exactly the right word. He found two of his biggest competitors who want to buy from him. He's getting 2 billion a month, 1.25 from Anthropic and 950 from Google. So 2 billion a month, 24 billion a year in terms of compute revenue. And then on top of that, he has Cursor coming in at the back end to fill those servers. So he is the most efficient compute player with the lowest cost of capital. It doesn't mean you have a foundation model. It means you're just a better compute player, but did he turn a loss into a win in the space of three months? In January 1st, you could have said, look at all those data centers and you don't have a foundation model. You're screwed. Here we are June 9th and he can say, I have a 24 billion dollar compute business and I have this other business that's coming in that's going to be doing 6 billion that will run on my servers.

8:31

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_02] And Elon, an incredible transition. Two private rounds that were large. Ramp raises $750 million at a $44 billion valuation. We've discussed Ramp a lot, tripled in a year, crossed a billion in ARR, positive free cash flow. And then also Suno, the AI music creator company, raised $400 million at a $5.4 billion valuation, testing first license model. Bond led that one. It was double the previous valuation just six months ago. Anything on either of those? Ramp, we've said it before.

8:35

SPEAKER_01

It gets to the revenue. They'll trade like financial services companies, but they will be adjusted for growth. When Brex slowed down to, I can't remember what it was, 30, 40%, they sold for six X. Here we have Ramp. I've heard they're actually as much as 1.25 billion. So they're trading at 30 to 40 times. It's all a growth path. If the growth keeps up, this will be a smart round. If the growth goes down to anything like normalized growth, it won't be. It's the same bet with Revolut. They're raising at a hundred and something, they're doing what? Four and a half billion in revenue, 1.5 billion in operating income, which is amazing. These companies are great. Banks don't trade at 40 times, 50 times earnings. They trade at 12 times. On both of them, it's really just people always say, will this trade like a tech company or like a financial services company? It'll trade like a financial services company, but it will be adjusted for growth. Ramp is getting the growth and they just seem to do a very good job of reading the Zeitgeist and their AI story, their adoption story. They just seem to do a good job on all that. So for now they got the growth. As long as they got the growth, the math works and it's a big opportunity. So we'll see.

8:43

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_02] Jason, you're trying Suno, the music AI company.

8:47

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_00] You having it for your personless office, Suno, just playing AI music. I do like Suno. I do pay for Suno. It's one of those ones that if I were more cost sensitive, I would cancel my subscription because I think I pay 15 or 20 bucks a month for three songs. There are certain apps that I think they're fragile for certain users because I'll continue to pay them, but barely. The utility is there, but barely. It is amazing. I'm not maybe even though I'm a customer for a while and user, the rate at which that valuation doubled and the 20 billion outcome for it, I'm not smart enough to see it yet. So it feels a little bit to me like risk on. The revenue justifies it. The growth justifies it. The stickiness justifies it. The brand justifies it. Nothing you can't lose in AI. But I don't know. We'll see it at the IPO. I just don't know where all this money's coming from.

8:49

SPEAKER_02

I'm saying with all the IPOs and then rather you mentioned Revolut again, Rory, is that targeting 750 million with the secondary sale that they're doing at the one 15. And then all the IPOs, we say, where is all this money coming from?

8:54

SPEAKER_01

There's always money when people aren't afraid. When it gets scary, it's not that money runs out. It's that money gets scared. In the same thing in a bull market, it's not that more money's been made. It's that people are [SPEAKER_02] Is that targeting 750 million with the secondary sale that they're doing at 1.15? [SPEAKER_02] And then all the IPOs, we say, should we, where is all this money coming from? David Pérez There's always money when people aren't afraid.

9:12

SPEAKER_01

David Pérez Man, there's no money. And when it gets scary, as I always say that, cause the converse, I actually came to my point. I always say the converse is important. When things get scary, it's not that money runs out. It's that money gets scared. Right. And in the same thing in a bull market, it's not that more money's been made. It's that people are brave. There'll always be money when people are brave and there'll be nothing but treasuries when they're not. [SPEAKER_02] David Pérez How long will they be brave for, Rory?

9:24

SPEAKER_01

David Pérez If I knew that, Harry, I wouldn't be sitting there talking to you. I'd be trading in QQQ. I don't know. At some point they won't get brave, but right now, it fills everyone's risk on. So yeah, I think people are brave.

9:29

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_00] David Pérez Well, we've all convinced ourselves the rules have changed now, right? You can go one to a hundred in a year and so many other things have changed. We throw these numbers, these growth numbers out as if it doesn't require a massive change in externalities to justify them. Oh, everyone, all the best startups go from one to a hundred in a year. One to 20 in a year is pretty good today. You want to be doing five to eight by the time you get out of YC. The rules have changed and they have changed, but there's a limit to how much the rules can change, right? There is, it's called GDP.

9:34

SPEAKER_01

Harry Sperger Yes. And it's also called human nature. I think the rules have changed what's doable. But what we do is in the face of these increased opportunities, we all get more aggressive and we keep on getting aggressive until the only thing that stops us being aggressive is someone gets burnt, right? It's the whole Minsky analysis of, you're going to do what you're going to do and it's going to continue. And the only thing that will stop it is overreaching. And the skill is to figure out when you're at that point. Like it was funny. Last Friday, there was a little dip and you never know why stocks go down when things were overpriced. But the narrative was, the employment numbers were good. So therefore rates won't go down and therefore stocks went down and intellectually. Yeah. I generally find things don't go to hell in the hand basket because employment is good, but that's not going to be how this thing ends. Right.

9:39

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_02] David Wright Well, it was because of chip. It was because of chip guidance to be clear as chip guidance of 16 billion, Mr. 17.2. [SPEAKER_02] David Wright Yeah. You're talking about Broadcom. [SPEAKER_02] David Wright Yeah.

9:55

SPEAKER_01

David Wright It was some of that. And then it was just yeah. But yes, they got guided. I mean, I think what that, if we're going to talk about that, all that said is when you're priced for perfection, which is always true, when you're priced for perfection, even a small miss to expectations filters true very quickly. And that's all that happened there. You know, the semiconductor index is up 100% year to date. So it turns out it's pretty vulnerable to correction. [SPEAKER_02] David Wright Oh, well.

10:06

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_02] David Wright One that's amazing, which we may not have commented on, but it is amazing. It's Bending Spoons. This is a roll up play on traditionally consumer companies. Some of their properties are very well known, but Evernote, Vimeo, WeTransfer, AOL, Eventbrite, very massively executed roll up strategy, a billion three in revenue, and they're filing to go public at $20 billion in the US from Italy. I hasten to add, one of few large Italian success stories to be very blunt. I thought it was amazing. I don't know if you guys have comment on it, but I thought fantastic success story.

10:12

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_00] David Wright Well, to me, the part I didn't appreciate, and I do appreciate it, is that they turned around these companies. I mean, Evernote was dead and they reaccelerated the growth of Evernote with a fifth of the employees. I mean, it sure makes you think a lot of management teams are pretty suspect if frickin' Bending Spoons from Italy can turn Vimeo around, Evernote around, good God. If AOL becomes the next hot thing, I mean, these guys are geniuses.

10:18

SPEAKER_01

David Wright I think I did read it in detail because I was super interested, right? And turned around is an interesting expression. I mean, what they do, their MO is they buy these things, they cut all extraneous expenditure, including a lot of the acquisition expenditure. It's very like a little ironic, like the Vista playbook in Enterprise. And then they raise prices massively. So if you look, I actually tried to figure out the organic growth rate of each enterprise because they're growing nicely overall, but a large part of the reason they're growing is they're adding new companies. So by definition, revenue goes up, right? I think they had, I'm trying to find my notes here. I had the growth rate last year. It was stellar, something like 90%, but most of it's acquisition. So you're trying to piece through, Jason, and then you're trying to find out what did they do in terms of growth by entity. That's the next level down. And even then they get pretty good growth rate, to your point out of the gate, right? But then you go one level below that. How do they do that? It's mainly price rising. It's very hard to get any sense of unit growth by individual products.

10:23

SPEAKER_01

David Wright It was stellar, something like 90%, but most of it's acquisition.

10:29

SPEAKER_00

[SPEAKER_01] David Wright So you're trying to piece through, Jason, [SPEAKER_01] David Wright And then you're trying to find out what did they do in terms of growth by entity. [SPEAKER_01] David Wright That's the next level down. [SPEAKER_01] David Wright And even then they get pretty good growth rate, [SPEAKER_01] to your point out of the gate, right? [SPEAKER_01] David Wright But then you go one level below that. [SPEAKER_01] David Wright How do they do that? [SPEAKER_01] David Wright It's mainly price rising. [SPEAKER_01] David Wright It's very hard to get any sense of unit growth by individual products.

11:20

SPEAKER_00

[SPEAKER_01] David Wright So in other words, what they're doing is they're taking Evernote, [SPEAKER_01] David Wright As an example, it's doing 200 million in revenue. [SPEAKER_01] David Wright They just cut all the marketing initiatives other than high ROI stuff. [SPEAKER_01] David Wright So they take out 80% of the marketing spend, [SPEAKER_01] David Wright Focus the team on features, raise the prices 80% over the course of two years, [SPEAKER_01] 10% of the existing users go maybe 20%. [SPEAKER_01] David Wright Their net retention is reasonably decent. [SPEAKER_01] David Wright It's below 100, but it's reasonably decent.

12:06

SPEAKER_00

[SPEAKER_01] David Wright So they raise prices and the people who really want it stay, right? [SPEAKER_01] David Wright And it's really hard to grow new businesses, but what it means is it kicks off cash. [SPEAKER_01] David Wright And you know, let's get real here.

12:30

SPEAKER_01

David Wright Anyone who hasn't churned from AOL now Ain't churned until they die, right?

12:38

SPEAKER_00

[SPEAKER_01] David Wright So you can raise money on that.

12:41

SPEAKER_01

David Wright You know, you've had a whole two decades, people. David Wright I mean, it is 26 years since the AOL Time Warner acquisition, right? David Wright You've had 26 years to churn off this thing. David Wright You're going nowhere, right? David Wright So they have very sticky inertia customers and they stick it to them, right?

13:00

SPEAKER_00

[SPEAKER_01] David Wright It's an excellent business. [SPEAKER_01] David Wright I mean, the big three properties are AOL, Eventbrite, and I want to say Vimeo. [SPEAKER_01] David Wright It was interesting in the top 10 or about 80%. [SPEAKER_01] David Wright I think Evernote, which I use is in the top 10, but not top three. [SPEAKER_01] David Wright You still use Evernote?

13:10

SPEAKER_01

David Wright I don't use it, but I have a bunch of stuff in it. David Wright So I paid for another year. David Wright I need to get it out and figure out where I'm going. David Wright It's a long story, but I'm not using it. David Wright I'm using ChatGPT, but I got to get all my stuff into one place. David Wright It's a long discussion. David Wright Well, they've increased pricing from... David Wright What was the last supper like? David Wright Sure, shut up. David Wright Let's focus on the business.

13:55

SPEAKER_02

[SPEAKER_01] David Wright So yeah, I looked at my goal. [SPEAKER_01] David Wright The odd thing is this is a consumer internet version of early Vista, Toma Brava. [SPEAKER_01] David Wright Buy those companies, cut the costs, raise the prices, and probably tap them out.

14:08

SPEAKER_01

David Wright So the question, is it a great business? David Wright Should it go public at 20 times revenues or 15 times revenues? David Wright Maybe not, because you are relying on the acquisition for organic. David Wright I mean, you're not getting organic growth. David Wright You're getting a profitable business, and you probably have to look at the David Wright But it's hard to value on a growth multiple, and you might be leaning in another

14:30

SPEAKER_00

[SPEAKER_01] David Wright But I think it's a great story, because everyone was playing in the enterprise space.

14:31

SPEAKER_01

David Wright What these guys realize is there's similar opportunity in the consumer side, David Wright Which simply, the whole idea was in these verticals, David Wright No one's going to change their car dealer accounting system because they put prices up 20% David Wright In the same way, the default consumer is going to stay. David Wright So it's totally sensible, an orthogonal plate, David Wright What everyone else was doing said it deserved the prize. David Wright Should the prize be 10 or 20? That's a different question.

15:02

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[SPEAKER_01] David Wright But yeah, great story. David Wright Does it diminish what we've previously said about the bar to go public today?

15:08

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_02] David Wright You know, they don't get me wrong. They're that fantastic scale. It's a billion three

15:08

SPEAKER_02

in revenue, which is awesome. But we have said that we're seeing this kind of bifurcation and you need to be huge. David Wright No, you said it. I haven't said it. [SPEAKER_00] David Wright But they're growing what 70 or 80%? What are

15:16

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_00] Ben's been growing? David Wright I mean, [SPEAKER_00] David Wright I mean, Rory would know better than me. I'm not even convinced the markets care as much [SPEAKER_00] as we think whether it's organic or inorganic. Salesforce itself is, [SPEAKER_00] David Wright The balance of it is inorganic at some point, and then it becomes organic. [SPEAKER_00] David Wright We don't even think about a lot of these [SPEAKER_00] David Wright As inorganic or again, does anybody really care? I mean, [SPEAKER_00] David Wright As long as it works, if they can keep finding these targets for the right price,

15:51

SPEAKER_02

[SPEAKER_00] David Wright If they can do what they did with Evernote, which is raise the pricing from $75 to $250 [SPEAKER_00] a year on average, right? If they can find enough of these without just running out of affordable [SPEAKER_00] targets, going to the founder's letter, it sounds better to me than starting something from scratch.

16:07

SPEAKER_00

David Wright There's got to be 800 unicorns to buy. Just go buy those ones. [SPEAKER_02] David Wright I really liked his letter. He said, [SPEAKER_02] David Wright Finding product market fit is just a continuous mission of luck [SPEAKER_02] David Wright In some ways. And then the execution machine built after that requires no luck at all.

16:30

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_00] David Wright Totally. Absolutely. [SPEAKER_00] David Wright It's just traditionally, [SPEAKER_00] David Wright The Constellation version was one to two [SPEAKER_00] X revenues, right? I don't know what bending spoons blended [SPEAKER_00] David Wright Well, we do. [SPEAKER_00] David Wright Maybe it's not revenue based. I just don't know. David Wright Yeah. This is Constellation for consumer with a much higher valuation because right now, David Wright Software is under pressure and this stuff isn't. David Wright Speaking of big enough to go public, guys,

17:17

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_02] David Wright Data Bricks come out today. No, no. We're going to do another round. We're going to do [SPEAKER_02] another round. 165 billion priced up from 134 billion earlier this year. Obviously not going public [SPEAKER_02] with that announcement anytime soon. How do we think about that? David Wright I mean, look, [SPEAKER_00] David Wright Well, we do. [SPEAKER_00] David Wright Maybe it's not revenue based. I just don't know. David Wright Yeah. This is Constellation for consumer with a much higher valuation because right now, Software is under pressure and this stuff isn't. David Wright Speaking of big enough to go public, guys,

17:56

SPEAKER_01

[SPEAKER_02] David Wright Databricks came out today. No, no. We're going to do another round. We're going to do another round. 165 billion priced up from 134 billion earlier this year. Obviously not going public with that announcement anytime soon. How do we think about that?

18:03

SPEAKER_01

David Wright I mean, look, the argument we said for why the big model providers are going public is they have a huge capital need, right? And I actually think I was, might have been Diamond or someone who said, the Goldman guy said recently, there are three reasons to go public. You want capital, you want currency to buy other things, you want to get liquidity for your shareholders, right? If you don't have one of those three things, then do you want the hassle? So I think Databricks, unlike these guys, for now at least, may well be in the position where their capital needs are still manageable. I mean, for context, reminder, the last private round at Anthropic was 30 billion and the last private round at OpenAI was 122 billion, right? So this is less than, oh my God, it's 0.1% of the last OpenAI private round. So what that says is, if there's money to fund OpenAI, there was money to fund Databricks private. So they can do it for longer because it's not the same need. It's a software company, not a model. They don't have to. Now, I personally think you should at four or five billion in revenue at the margin. I think in the end, you'll find logically the cost of capital should be cheaper in the public markets. But right now it's not. Databricks can get capital at a higher revenue multiple because of their higher growth rate than Snowflake can and on hassle-free terms. I also think the other argument made, which does resonate with me, is the idea that this is going to be a noisy year. I mean, you've got SpaceX by Friday, you've got the two big model companies by the end of the year. There's a lot going on. It may well be next year is a clean deal. But the bigger point is they don't need it. The amount of money that you need to build a foundation model is two or three orders of magnitude more than anything else. So the imperative for those guys to do public is different. All right, boys, is there anything that I've missed that you think we should discuss? Other things that made it to the top? SaaS now trades at a discount to the S&P 500 for the first time in history. Wow. That's sad.

18:07

SPEAKER_02

Meta weighing tens of billions more for capex spend following in the suit of Google. Zuck. Atta boy.

18:12

SPEAKER_02

[SPEAKER_00] I'll tell you the only one, what small one I'll pick just for fun, if we're breaking. I think it's actually a more important story, but takes time to track. It is Microsoft's new models that it launches, right? Which I think they were clear there. I don't know what terms they use. Sorry, I'm traveling. It's in beta. I found it very interesting that the models can't even search the web. So there are certainly use cases where that's not important, but it's interesting to me that you would launch a model that can't extend its knowledge by searching the web. It's a flashback to when this show started when basically every chat with ChatGPT and everything was nine months ago, right? I don't remember. I have my memories only through September 2024. So the only thing that says to me is it's hard to predict whether anyone can really catch up. We think everyone can catch up. We think Microsoft can catch up. We think DeepSeek and open source can catch up, but if Microsoft launches these models and it doesn't even search the web, can we really keep up with the pace at Anthropic? I mean, the pace of change is so rapid. It's so impressive. So much progress. I just can't predict where it will play out over the rest of the year next year. I can't predict.

18:17

SPEAKER_02

[SPEAKER_01] But you are right, Jason. It didn't matter because it was the final recognition that frankly we should say for ages is you can't have Microsoft with such a core foundational technology and the way they don't control it just wasn't the long-term sustainable state. And they and OpenAI are somewhere between an open relationship and divorced. I can't quite figure it out. They're allowed as partners, but they're still together. I can't quite figure it out. But whatever, Microsoft needs its own control and they needed to do this. And you're right, Jason. The reviews, I haven't used it yet. The reviews are good, but not even as good as the best open source. But my takeaway is well done because you needed to do something and it's hard to imagine not playing here. And they tell a story about local use and a range of models, which I read as some version of we don't have to be the very best because we know we're not the very best. In general in life, you need to be the very best, but at least you need to be playing. It's a step to the goal. And that's why Google is so much further ahead. They're at least in the game. But this was the end of the period where you could fool yourself even slightly that your plan for AI is to partner with OpenAI. That's not the answer anymore. And it hasn't been for a couple of years for Microsoft. So onwards from here, my guess is they'll become the next sucking sound for talent and money. And you're right. They need to add the stuff that the other guys added two years ago. Can they do the Microsoft thing and grind their way to good enough over three to four years? Like Azure was never as good as AWS, but it was good enough for most of their corporates. Can they grind to something that's good enough in this space over the next two or three years, whereby they're not going to be as good as Anthropic or OpenAI, but they're good enough for the bulk of low end intelligence work. I don't know. It's an interesting question. I mean, they never caught up.

18:24

SPEAKER_02

[SPEAKER_01] sucking sound for talent and money. And you're right. They need to add the stuff that the other guys added two years ago. Can they, I hadn't thought, it's an interesting question. Can they do the Microsoft thing and grind their way to good enough over three to four years? Azure was never as good as AWS, but it was good enough for most of their corporates. Can they grind to something that's good enough in this space over the next two or three years, whereby they're not going to be as good as Entropic or OpenAI, but they're good enough for the bulk of low end intelligence work. I don't know. It's an interesting question. They never caught up in mobile. They never caught up in search. They did catch up in cloud compute, cloud compute with Azure and who knows here, but you're right. It is the one that matters. I mean, that and the where are the I mean, one of the big questions is between Microsoft and then the open source vendors are the open source vendors, especially, is it going to be a non-Chinese U.S. open source vendor? That's even within the spitting distance of the frontier models. Because that matters a lot from a pricing perspective. I think there's a lot of open source models today that are within spitting distance now.

18:30

SPEAKER_02

Yeah, there are, but mainly Chinese.

18:38

SPEAKER_02

[SPEAKER_01] And yeah, the question is, is that sustainable? And a lot of our companies are using them and is that sustainable, even though it's open source, is that sustainable over the medium term? If your only plan is you can download Kimmy or DeepSeek and you can fine tune it, that's great. But some of those Chinese companies are themselves going closed source. I think what happens to a U.S. open source competitor in the U.S. matters. And obviously you've got, I think it's Recursive and Poolside, a couple of Reflection and Poolside doing that. But that's to Jason's point. Sometimes you get caught up in the stories and you're the worst for that, Harry, because you just love the gossip, but Jason's right. What really matters is, is this going to be an oligopoly? Or is it going to be four or five players in foundation model and two years from now, which is why what Microsoft did matters.

18:39

SPEAKER_00

[SPEAKER_02] I just did a show with the founder of Nabius and he said the single biggest threat to Nabius is consolidation of models. Yes. If we have concentration of model kind of winning, we are in a tough space and we want an ecosystem, not a monopoly. Yes. There's a reason that everyone, other than Anthropic and OpenAI, is shoving money furiously at anyone else who can help or grow that competitive advantage. Now, I just did a show with Aaron of Perplexity, and he said that export controls have actually hurt the U.S. in many ways, because it's meant that they've innovated on architecture that they wouldn't have needed to and really built muscle that they wouldn't have had to. And combined with the open source model capability that they have, it's now a competitive threat that's even stronger. It was an interesting discussion. Rory, I have to say, we'll wrap. My mother texted me after our last episode and said that your quote on making money is like sex was the favorite moment of any Trio show that she's heard. And I got about 50 texts from people being like, that is the quote of the century. I've got to tell you, I think it's not in direct format, but there's a version like there's a version of that either in Fred Schwed's "Where Are the Customers' Yachts" from the 1960s or in "Reminiscence of a Stock Operator" from the 1920s. One of those two investing books hinted at that, but I always remembered it. So I'm not the original author, but the books are kind of three to five times older than you are, Harry. So it's kind of like the Bible as far as you're concerned.

18:49

SPEAKER_00

repackaging Gemini and giving up on AI, right? If that's the way we want to view it. But that's a little piece of wanting ultimately AI to be persistent 24-7. We do want this. We already we already live little hints of it. And it's pretty silly that AI, for the most part, lives lives in our browser, right? This, which is, if you think about it, very dated, very dated. I mean, it's so dated that we still use browsers. I mean, who would have, we got to get Marc Andre, I mean, the fact that we still live in the era of Netscape in so many ways. So I do think it's exciting. I do think as this show continues, the, you know, the, whatever we want to call it, the token

19:27

SPEAKER_00

apocalypse, I think it will morph into just standard business practice, right? At some point, there's only the IT budgets can only be so large. There's only so much, even if we lay off half of the, you know, unemployment, I mean, employment keeps growing. We're going to have to manage spend. So I do, I do think we're going to look back in two years and think of this non-persistent AI as, as almost archaic, right? As almost sort of desktop-like.

19:57

SPEAKER_01

Yeah. I mean, yeah, because you, you've thrown a lot there. We, we've pulled several faces there for the audience listening, Rory's facial. No, no, no. It's just that Jason, as he often does, covered a lot of different things. And I'm just processing through it more slowly is that on that, on the memory thing, I'm kind of with Jason is that it just totally makes sense, right? And the question, yeah, if you step back, you know, you have the core models and then you have what people are calling all the harness, which is all the stuff around it to make those models effective. And part of that, and it can either be in them,

20:28

SPEAKER_01

it should be in the model or it could in theory be in the harness, is just understanding memory so that you could, and the impact of that. And I think why Jason went to the token economics part of it is part of the thing should be, you should get better answers with memory. And part of the thing, it should be more cost effective in terms of token, because you're not passing through all the context all the time. You can perhaps, it's part of it. I mean, I think a lot of the trend on this harnesses will be adding stuff to minimize your cost on frontier models. And part of that will

20:58

SPEAKER_01

be having memory, right? It also leads to a better experience, right? I think that I actually just went in and tried to see, um, have it, has it been switched on in mine yet? Because it just makes a ton of sense. You should know who I am after I, after I look up 58, 20 VC podcasts, you know, I'm probably here to look at my 20 VC podcast researcher guys. So it just makes a ton of sense.

21:19

SPEAKER_02

Right. Most people know who you are now.

21:22

SPEAKER_01

No, I'm sure. But, but, but, but my opening eye sometimes doesn't. So yeah, it's a really, it's absolutely, it's one of the necessary to do's and they're doing it. That's great. And I just went to each other.

21:32

SPEAKER_02

Well, you pulled a face, you pulled a face when Jason said about Apple giving up on AI with Gemini. You're right there.

21:38

SPEAKER_01

You're moving on to that. That was an interesting one. Ben Thompson and Strackery did a really good piece on it this morning I was reading. Is that, I think, to some extent, they're giving in the sense that they're paying Google a billion dollars to use their model as the default model. But reminder, Google pays them, I think, 12 or 20, I used to know the number, 20 billion dollars to be the default search engine. And so it's a minor asset. I give them credit. I actually think that they're making some, yes, it would be better if they'd had their own model, but they're making progress on the use cases that just make a ton of sense for the consumer. And I think it was a,

22:14

SPEAKER_01

I think the amount of context you have when you're on someone's phone is such a, they can, they should be able to deliver a unique and compelling consumer experience for the kind of things they demoed on the thing about knowing context on which Rory. It's like, it's like to your memory comment, Jason, it's like knowing which Rory Harry's talking about, knowing your calendar, knowing everything and deliver a much better experience. Now, should they have been able to do it with their own model? Yeah. But the bottom line is they control the handset and for the consumer, it's a pretty powerful product. So I think they're in a good position to make progress. I don't think

22:49

SPEAKER_01

they're giving up. I actually think they're pragmatically saying, we kind of screwed up and not have our own model, but that's actually now what matters for us, for Apple. What matters for us, Apple is delivering an amazing experience to our consumers. Because if we do that, they'll keep buying handsets. And if keep buying handsets, we can probably afford to give someone a billion bucks a year, right? So I give them credit for getting their shit together. I mean, it is stunning that Siri is so bad for so long. So I think actually trying to fix it is just awesome. So I give them credit for step in the right direction, right? Is my takeaway from it.

23:23

SPEAKER_01

So the opposite, I don't think they've given up. I think they're doing what it needs to win coming from behind. And they have a great position. I mean, it's interesting. The person you have to think about this a lot with obviously is if you're open AI versus if you're on Tropic, because then Tropic has made the enterprise bet and open AI in part has made the consumer bet. And I like my open AI subscription because I sit at my desk and I do research, but for a lot, I mean, it was a great line and give Ben Thompson credit. He said, very clear. I've thought it, but I hadn't let anyone say it clear. He said, consumers don't want to work.

23:59

SPEAKER_01

There's not a big market for consumers in their non-working life to do a whole bunch of complex research or kind of using AI for productivity. They just want delightful experiences because they want to relax and attain. So I think actually, the consumer space is going to be a tougher space for open. The enterprise space has really been validated because an enterprise is all about automation efficiency and a consumer space. It's about experiences. Apple's well-placed to do that. Open AI has got to compete with that and compete with Google. And you know, it's a, it's a tough space, especially if Apple's getting a ship together.

24:36

SPEAKER_02

Well, speaking of consumers not wanting to work soon, they won't have to. Uber cuts 23% of HR.

24:44

SPEAKER_01

HR. Just to make Jason happy. We can now have Jason.

24:48

SPEAKER_02

Sorry. I'm so sorry. Obviously it's people losing jobs. It's terribly sad, but I'm the one who fucking said no great CEO likes HR and everyone got angry at me. And then everyone starts cutting HR. Anything of note here from Uber cutting 23% of HR, remote work rescinded, three-day in-office mandate company denies AI played a role despite 95% of engineers using it daily. Anything of note there?

25:16

SPEAKER_00

Well, look, HR and recruiting, right? Let's consider them different are the easiest things to cut, right? They're there. Recruiting is all, you know, you always, you always see any, any, any, any, any big tech leader stumble a little bit and they lay off 30% of the recruiting department. We're going to, you often want them back. I always wonder, I always think this is a, I mean, it makes sense on paper, right? The HR one will be interesting. I mean, we've, we've put out a call for someone to report to our AI VP of marketing, and I've gotten my head cut off a lot on social media for that by people not, it's okay. Not really listening to what I'm saying about that. But I do

25:54

SPEAKER_00

think HR is one of these areas that in many parts of it will be better managed by AI. I think an AI can be a better VP of HR for certain parts of the job than a biased human. I think there are advantages to having an AI VP of HR. Not, not, not, I don't want to get rid of all of the humans or even lay people off, but it's, it's an AI VP of HR can, can evaluate every single thing you've ever done. Every little bit of your work, all of your issues, whether an AI VP of HR can figure out, hey, maybe it really is your, your idiot boss, Jason, you know, maybe it really, maybe that really is the problem. It's not, it's not you. An AI VP of HR can find out a lot of things and

26:33

SPEAKER_00

process of ask. So I don't, I think it's a, it's under discussed versus area, other areas, but it

26:40

SPEAKER_01

should be massively disrupted. The big picture question in all these areas is, you know, how much efficiency do you get? My God, it felt 23%. I doubt everyone is automating and saving 23% using AI in the non-engineering departments because adoption there isn't as strong as engineering. Do I think there's some? Of course I do. So my bottom line is, I think my guess is some portion of this is quote unquote AI automation. I doubt it's 20% because I'm always calibrating off, you know, what is, I mean, it's on what percent it's, it's the Dario number, what percentage of quote unquote knowledge work is going to be automated and it's knowledge work tasks and then knowledge jobs.

27:21

SPEAKER_01

Is it five? Is it 10? Is it 50? As Dario has said, 23% felt like a lot, but whatever. Again, what you don't know is how much of it is just too many folks there and they're just party rationalizing. So it's a data point. I mean, I think the other data point from Uber is far more interesting, right? Which is not the AI for HR, but the AI for autonomous driving that they continue to make progress on autonomous driving. Which stat was that, Rory? No, that's the one you'd mentioned. I'm sorry, you'd, you'd met, you'd made a point there that they're, they're actually rolling out some more autonomous driving experience in Europe,

27:57

SPEAKER_01

in Madrid, I think. Right. So, you know, and they're kind of partnering with, I think it's a WeRider, some of the technology providers, but you know, it's the, the big, I mean, you know, if you want to talk automation, driving is one of the biggest targets in terms of the number of humans that do that job. And, you know, when you see Uber making experimental progress on robot taxi in Europe, you know, it's something obviously to keep an eye on. It's all, it's worth pointing out this stuff is still moving way slower than I think people anticipated. It hasn't been, you know, Waymo in San Francisco resulting in, you know, Waymo is everywhere within six months. It's been

28:35

SPEAKER_01

a long, steady progress for Waymo and Uber's doing what it should do, which is it obviously, this is existential. I mean, the Travis Kalnick devotees would say the failure, the cutting of their autonomous project in 2016 or 17 was a fatal error for Uber. I'm not sure. I think 10 years later, they can pick up the thread and which is what they're doing and catch up on that because it's not like the technology tip like a domino, but I think they're smart to now start, you know, pushing robotaxis and partnering with technology providers. And this is the, because you know, the question on the Uber stock is always, oh my God, is robotaxi existential, which is a bad scenario,

29:16

SPEAKER_01

or the good scenario is lots of people build robotaxi technology and Uber is in a wonderful position to be the coordinating thing because it's the app we use. And if they just add, you know, 10,000 robotaxis to the fleet, then things continue just fine. And frankly, it's good to see the Europeans do something. I mean, I said this respectfully, Harry, but typically, you know, Europe is the slow technical laggard, especially on stuff like that. So go Madrid.

29:44

SPEAKER_02

David Shepard Should we discuss the Revolut 115 billion? 115 billion.

29:51

SPEAKER_01

Amazing. David Shepard

29:52

SPEAKER_02

Yeah, thank you.

29:53

SPEAKER_01

David Shepard I think you're doing that. I'm going to push it. I think you're doing that defensively. You felt I was dissing on you in Europe and you're basically implicitly saying, oh, look at Revolut. It's amazing. Correct? David Shepard Correct. David Shepard And it is amazing. And you know why it exists? Because the European banks, unlike the American banks in general, are so crappy. There's a reason that Revolut's worth 115 billion because the incumbent European banks were fat, dumb, and happy and making margin off their customers. And there's a reason why Chime is worth 5 billion, still a great outcome, by the way.

30:22

SPEAKER_01

That's because the US banks are now a little more efficient. David Shepard David Shepard That's also why Newbank is such a valuable business. Because the Brazilian banks were inefficient. I think all these fintechs, they can be, I mean, it really is a, I mean, it's proven markets. It's a function of how egregiously priced the incumbents are. And, you know, Europe, especially when it had non-single currency, you had all this foreign exchange, because you guys aren't in the Europe. You had, you know, the FX chargers, you had all this transporter bullshit. And Revolut just blew a hole for that. So I think it's amazing. And I know you're

30:56

SPEAKER_01

a big fan of the CEO. And I think it's just, I wish him all the best and pound those old school European banks into the dirt. I mean, at some point, we're going to have to deal with the fact that the largest bank by market cap doesn't do much lending. And that's actually going to be a real problem in the aggregate. Because the whole point is of banking is to recycle savings into lending. And right now, Revolut is not a long term lender, but that's by the by. They're killing it.

31:28

SPEAKER_02

David I'm fascinated to hear Jason's thoughts on this one. What's dominated my Twitter over the last week is Greg Eisenberg's original tweet about a horror story of venture fund raise. It led to a slew, I mean, hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of founders sharing horror stories, including the Cloudflare CEO, who said about his experience with Kostler and Vinod Kostler. Jason, I'm really intrigued to hear your thoughts on this one. I'm sure you have some. How did you feel about this slew of founders bluntly saying how terrible a VC experience they had in certain cases?

32:09

SPEAKER_00

Well, I'd say a couple things. First of all, I have, you know, as when I was in the most intense phase of founder, I had those stories too. I really, we forget how deep some of these things cut, these slights. The folks that are friends of ours now, that we co-invest with, I thought terrible things of at the time, literally. One that we both know really well would constantly use me just to do diligence on another investment constantly. And now I'm pretty zen about that crap. The founders, I'm like, just take the meeting and do reverse intel. Like if you're just being used for a competitor, then sit down with him and just

32:48

SPEAKER_00

find out about your competitor, you know, get, get the exact information. But man, that stuff really, it really burned me. And founders hold, you know, so a couple of things, first of all, the, the whole thing with the CEO of Cloudflare, just remember founders hold grudges. I still do. I'm just getting over them now. I'm just getting over my founder grudges. So founders hold grudges in a way that VCs actually, I think don't because VCs, you miss the deal. You got to find another bus, right? Having said all that, get over it because it's, it's sales. The only thing that to really have a

33:22

SPEAKER_00

grudge, a true grudge on is if you got fired. Okay. That one, that one, I think, I think the folks that hate benchmark from Uber, I think they deserve to hate benchmark. I think there's others, but if you're treated poorly during the fundraising, get over it, it's sales. Have you never sold? This is what I say to people. Have you never sold anything? Have you ever, never thought a customer deal was going to close and it didn't? Have you ever not talked to a prospect where they told you, Rory, of course we're going to buy by the end of the quarter. And then you just send them 28 emails

33:53

SPEAKER_00

and 87 texts and the deal never closes. How is it any different selling stock than anything else? So there's a bunch of issues to separate the grudge, the firing, which is a niche issue,

34:04

SPEAKER_01

and learn, learn to sell, man, but grow some. In one sense, you're right, Jason. But I think the difference for the founder, and I think a ton of what you said, super insightful. The difference is the founder in this case, isn't selling their product. They're selling themselves. So I think you're right about one thing, the rejections cut deeper, right? And there's no doubt. Even on my side, I remember a VCR 30 years ago said to me, you never forget the LP turndowns. And 30 years later, he's so right. You remember those people who turned it. It's just a personal thing because you're not

34:40

SPEAKER_01

just selling your product. You're not selling Ford cars on the deal a lot. You're selling yourself. And when you get turned down, it hurts. So I totally with you, Jason, is that you do have to grow a pair. You do have to get a thick skin. But I totally get the way founders, even if it's something doesn't go wrong in the process, I totally get it. Rejection sucks, right? And as yet, so that's the founder side. And I thought you were super sympathetic there. And then just to put the other side of the table, every venture person is in a business where we turn down 99 out of 100 deals that we look at.

35:16

SPEAKER_01

So rejection is our default MO. And that's why I always rest with these ratings businesses, right? You know, the kind of rating VCs. It's doable. And I think there actually is appropriate ways to do it. But you do have to remember that the default is a no. And it's really hard to high customer sat when 99 times out of 100, you're going to tell the customer no. It's why no one ever loves the bank that they apply to the lending money. Because a well-run bank turns down, you know, five out of six customers. No one likes that experience. Rejection sucks, right? So it's set up for failure out of the gate. Sometimes, you know, in the course of turning down two,

35:56

SPEAKER_01

three hundred people a year, you get some stuff wrong. What was interesting is Matthew was really

36:00

SPEAKER_00

upset that Vinod asked him to consider getting rid of Michelle, who we know who is great and his CTO, and giving him the shares, not stealing his shares, which I think was misinterpreted. He made a suggestion in a pitch. And listen, I'm a super fan of Michelle. I would not make that suggestion. But let's step back for a minute. We've all had those meetings with founders where the team is very unbalanced. And would I, am I the node? And would I say it that way? No, but you might know me well enough. I almost would, you know, in a different situation. I almost would say that to a founder. I just wouldn't do it during a pitch. I would just say it's not a fit for me.

36:41

SPEAKER_00

But I find myself constantly post-investing the only one that would say things like, you know, what are you going to do with your co-founder? You know what? And she's just Rory's just not committed enough. He's not getting it done. And so I think his directness is interesting that it bothered the CEO of Cloudflare so much. But in a way, it was just his read of the team. I think it was wrong, at least for one of them, but the read of the team.

37:09

SPEAKER_01

And by wrong, you mean incorrect relative to the subsequent outcome, right?

37:13

SPEAKER_00

Well, I would, I know Michelle, I don't know Michelle that well. I think she's a great founder. So I would keep her. But the fact that BC's go in and you see that the founders are not equal in terms of their commitment and skill set, right?

37:27

SPEAKER_01

I mean, look, don't comment on this because look, it's clear, given the superb outcome, that whatever Cloudflare had, it shouldn't have been touched one little bit. It should have just been let do exactly what it did. It's a great outcome. So you're right. I think, again, Jason, you raise a good point. You go in, you know, you see things and especially at the earliest stages, if you think the team is wrong, but you want to do the deal, then, you know, that's a really tricky conversation, right? And you should be aware of having, and I think just as well as when you're as successful as Vinod, you're like, I could take three meetings and

37:59

SPEAKER_01

slowly and delicately get to this point, or maybe I'll just say it. Now, it's also worth pointing out, he said very clearly, he doesn't believe that happened. So I think, you know, I think stepping back, I don't know if it's a useful way to rehash. I mean, the more successful you are, the more meetings you'll have, the more meetings you have, the more likely some of them go wrong, especially if you're direct and Vinod is nothing if not direct. So stuff happens. I mean, as someone pointed out, he was on the Juniper list for the first, he was on the Midas list the first time for Juniper and he's on the Midas list this year for OpenAI. And there's 30 years between those

38:30

SPEAKER_01

two events. So he must be doing something right overall. But we just still have to say that on an individual day, you can piss people off. And look, I'm sure I look back across 300, 400 turn downs a year for 30 years. I know there's been some where I wish I'd handled it differently. There's been one or two or Lily at the term sheet level. I wish I'd handled it differently. It happens. It's not ideal. You know, if you're aware of it, you apologize later and say, look, I got that wrong. And you just have to move on. It's some element of breakage is inevitable.

39:01

SPEAKER_02

I have to admit, Rory, I disagree with you. What? I've been turned down by lots of LPs. The best way to have revenge is that you forget they even existed. I'm being a dick here, but like a lot of them ping me now. I'm like, wow. And when they turned me down when I was 21, I'm like, whoa. And you're like, who are you?

39:20

SPEAKER_01

Yeah, maybe early on, you early on, you remember you're right over time to Jason's point, you developed a thick skin and you're right. I remember much less the turn downs on fund seven than on fund. Yeah, the first one was fun. So I do remember on fund three, our first independent fund, which we foolishly timed literally for the week of the great financial crisis in November 08, getting turned down three times in the space of an hour. So I do remember that pretty vividly, but life goes on.

39:47

SPEAKER_02

Okay. So again, big milestones for Lovable and Cursor this week. Lovable, so literally just before we came on, Lovable hit 500 million of error. The number was wrong. So 500 million of error with 146 employees. Cursor has hit 4 billion and it's targeting 6 billion at the end of the year. Jason, you're the man of the hour for this one. You're the coder. Any thoughts on this? This was unprecedented.

40:19

SPEAKER_00

Listen, I think there's two different things you said. One was about the scale, right, of these companies, right? Which we've talked, I do think the headcount thing is something that we're still learning about, right? And so I think when we started this show, we were in an area where folks were very lean and growing very quickly. But the question was, does this normalize over time? As you approach scale, as you approach 100 million, 200 million, 500 million, a billion in revenue, will startups get fat again, right? Do you just need these layers? And I can think of a number of hot AI startups that are getting pretty fat, especially on go-to-market teams and others,

40:57

SPEAKER_00

but we're seeing more and more examples to the contrary. And it is disruptive on many levels if you can stay as efficient as these guys are. It is disruptive to investing. It is disruptive to employees because it will shrink the number of these great roles and it will increase compensation, right? To the click-up point, to Zeb's point, I'm doing layoffs to give million dollars to a handful of folks. Lovable can pay its team whatever it wants, right? With less than 200 employees, it can pay whatever it wants. But man, if this becomes the steady state for startups, and maybe it was in the old days, maybe in the old days of Microsoft it was true,

41:41

SPEAKER_00

but it's just so different if they're not going to reflate, is what I think about. Because it's not a lot of people, man. And what people don't understand, I know Replit a little bit of Lovable, but they're the same. They're pushing out a lot of code. One thing you could say is, oh, it's easy because they only have one product, right? That would be a comeback that I think a little bit like, you don't have to have 22 products like Datadog or 7000 like Salesforce. Well, maybe, but these are pretty complicated products, okay? You've got database, you've got hosting, you've got management, you've got SEO you're running. These guys are pushed because it's the most

42:18

SPEAKER_00

brutally competitive space it is. They're pushing out more features than any of us did our entire lifetimes a generation ago. So I don't think these folks are working, they're incredibly hard and they're incredibly productive. So I did almost, and if you want to be, you want to have some contempt for VCs tying this together, I'm kind of contentious of startups that need to be fat. I'm like, what's your excuse? What do you need another 200 people for? And when I'm at a board meeting and a VP says, or they're all C levels now, right? A C of something. There's no VPs anymore in startups. They're all Cs. And they say, well, I could do that, but I need another 50 or 100 heads.

42:59

SPEAKER_00

I need another 10 or 20 or 40 million. I just think that person should go.

43:04

SPEAKER_01

The only comment on, and first of all, broadly agree, but the only pushback I'll make is this, right? We're having the, oh, they're amazing that they can do this with only 146 heads. But remember, if you're spending 50 to 70% of your revenue on intelligence from Entropic or OpenAI, you don't have the, I mean, it's a different business, right? You don't have the option to also have 50 to 70% of your revenue on employees because there's not enough room in the percentages, right? So there's some, I mean, they're just different businesses with different business

43:37

SPEAKER_00

models, right? They are, but you have the choice of who you invest in or who you work for, right?

43:42

SPEAKER_01

We have our legs in pocketbooks, right? No, of course. And this is actually one of the core challenges many of these other companies are going to have. If you can be one of the 146 employees, that is, I agree with you, Jason, 100%, that is getting levered from this AI such that your economics are compelling because you're one of a small group of people making a lot of money in a business that's leveraging technology to have a very high revenue per head count. It means we can pay you a lot. That's a far better place to be as an employee, you're right, than, you know, one of,

44:16

SPEAKER_01

yeah, 18, whatever it is, 90,000 employees at Salesforce. You're exactly right because you're not getting levered from the, you're not getting levered from the models and intelligence, right? And this is the, how much will be labor and how much will be intelligence? This is the kind of what's the split and what you're seeing to your point. I'm sorry, I'm rambling on this, but it's clear in my head. I want to get it across. In businesses that are using a lot of intelligence and I'm using tokens as a proxy for that, then small numbers of people can achieve a lot and make a lot. And those are better

44:50

SPEAKER_01

places to be as an employee and often as an investor, right? Yeah. Then to be, you know, slogging it out with 10 times the employees, not a ton of new leverage from AI. And yeah, you're stuck

45:02

SPEAKER_00

in 2010's ground game. Which sucks. That's what you'd want to do if you could as a founder, as an employee, as an investor, you'd want that all, if you could, that's the model you'd want. That's where I'd want to go work. I want to go work somewhere where I'm empowered, where I'm one of 172

45:19

SPEAKER_01

people at 500 million in revenue. I matter. To your point, Jason, I do think, and I want to call it out. I do think as you start to develop an enterprise motion and you implicitly said it, you're probably talking about the foundation models who are building big go to market machines, because they have to, we are going to see way more bodies. I don't buy, there's not going to be an infinite number of- Oh, worry, I hate that. It's not just, I mean, it's Lagorre, it's Harvey, it's your Sierras. When you're selling to enterprise, this idea that 157 people can do it on their own is not going to be true. I think for products, because remember, in the end of the day,

45:51

SPEAKER_01

someone wants to- It's not that it- Hang on, agree. In any business, there's only two things that happen. People are either making stuff or selling stuff. If they're not doing any of those two things, they're just overhead. To your point, if you're selling stuff via PLG, then you only need people to make stuff, so you can be pretty lean. Once you start selling to, as you say, to law firms, once you start selling to corporates, then you do end up with a big-ass sales force. One of my theories is that that doesn't change from cycle to cycle. The Entropic sales force in five years will look like the Oracle sales force, the Microsoft sales force, and the IBM

46:30

SPEAKER_01

sales force 50 years ago. Because-

46:32

SPEAKER_00

But here's the thing. I don't know that that's going to be true, Rory. First of all, I don't mean to go back to the law. If we compare Replit and Lovable, I know Replit's hiring 250 sales reps this year. So that's going to look very much like a traditional organization. Lovable isn't, okay? And it's different DNAs and different goals. And the majority of Anthropics, enterprise sales are not allowed to talk to a human. And so my point from that, we can't all be Anthropic. Founders are choosing, they are choosing to have leaner go-to-market teams, leaner sales. They just don't want this crap. They just don't want 250 people running around.

47:09

SPEAKER_00

And they're willing to trade off some marginal revenue. I mean, Anthropic has less than 5,000 employees, right? So they're just saying culturally. And so I don't think that they're all going to, I thought they would all look like SAP and Oracle and Salesforce. We're not seeing that. We're not seeing that. We're seeing something in the middle where they still want to be lean.

47:31

SPEAKER_01

It's not going to be 147 people doing 500 million when it's enterprise sales.

47:36

SPEAKER_00

But what you might see is, is three to two to five times the level of efficiency. And it just changes the culture, the head counts where people are. That's the difference, right? It doesn't really matter whether it's zero or four X, right?

47:50

SPEAKER_01

I agree. It will be better. No matter what happens, when you start with a clean slate and leveraging intelligence, you just become way more efficient. I agree. These companies, on average, will be way more efficient. When you do a comparison, it's over 3 million

48:05

SPEAKER_02

an hour per head versus, and I'm not, but like a Salesforce, which is 350K per head.

48:11

SPEAKER_01

It's nine times more efficient. Yeah. But again, I'm just going to say it here. Yes, you're true. But Salesforce, enterprise heavy, R and D heavy, no intelligence costs, right? Remember, they have 300 million of, they just said it of tokens, which let's just do it here. We did the math. That's roughly 10 or 15 grand per engineer and engineers are about only one fifth of what they have. So remember that 300,000 ARR, probably only 1% of that is tokens. Do you understand me, Harry? In other words, Salesforce has $300,000 of revenue per head, which means if they're going to make money, they can't pay anyone more than 200,000, right? And they're probably spending 1% of revenue

48:54

SPEAKER_01

per head on tokens. Contrast that with your example of Wepplet. They're getting 2.3 million per head, but they're probably spending 70% of dollars on tokens. It's just vastly different businesses. And one of them is more aggressively leveraging the new enabling technology. So to Jason's point, it's probably a sweeter spot to be one of the 147 people in that gig than one of the, I used to know the head cut. Now I don't, I probably could do it by Matt, that 20, 30,000 people in a much larger organization where you don't have leverage. They're just different businesses. But this is, to me,

49:32

SPEAKER_00

this is, this is much more interesting than layoffs in these stories. I think everybody, every founder, forget about older companies, every founder today wants to run a startup that's at least a million in revenue per employee or more. They're targeting 2 million. They want to be in a million, and they want it because they want great teams. They want lean teams. They want the best people. They, they want to work this way. They want to go to work with people they look up to and respect. They so I, my, my sense is that roughly over the coming years, startups will be half the size that they

50:07

SPEAKER_00

used to be for revenue, including enterprise. This is, this is very much B2B focused. And that's a big, that's a much bigger change than whether this company does a 10 or 15% lab. If everyone's half the size they used to be, it's a much bigger change.

50:21

SPEAKER_01

By definition, if you invent something that's meant to augment humans and make them more efficient, and that thing is called AI and it does a trillion in revenue, by definition, you need to see a trillion of efficiencies. And the way efficiencies show up is less humans per unit of task. You're exactly right. That's the bet. If it wasn't happening, the entire thesis of the case would be bullshit. So you're right, Jason, it's gotta be happening. If the people who sell AI can't be efficient with AI, then what chance is there for the rest of them? Do I agree with you?

50:58

SPEAKER_02

David Morgan Did Elon have the acquisition of the year buying cursor for what will be 10 times end of year revenue? It looks a pretty prescient buy if

51:05

SPEAKER_01

they're going to hit target. Jason It looks pretty clever. I mean, I think what we talked about, it was a clever deal on every dimension. I mean, when I was thinking about this, because I'm always skeptical on the valuation, but Elon did such an amazing job of meeting the AI moment. And let me tell you what I mean by that. It's like, you know, you look back and you go, he obviously founded OpenAI and then all the drama happened, blah, blah, blah. But in the last 24 months, he moved from ground zero to building Colossus, building Colossus 2, dealing with his model, but just because he had the guts to show up and spend that kind of money, because to be fair,

51:47

SPEAKER_01

he does have the cheapest cost of capital on the planet. He found himself with, you know, gigawatts of capacity just when everyone needed it, was able to sell it to them, and then did the cursor deal also to kind of backfill the space, right? And everything stems from the fact that he had the big picture conviction that AI mattered and he was willing to put 30, I mean, it's astonishing, 20 to 30 billion dollars of capital in the ground in advance of revenue because he felt this was the trend to back. And at least right now, it looks like a great trend. You're right, pressing this is exactly the right word. He found two of his biggest competitors who want to buy from him.

52:25

SPEAKER_01

You know, he's getting 2 billion a month, 1.25 from Antropic and 950 from, no, the other way around, 950 from Antropic, I won't put two of our from Google, the other way around, 2 billion a month, 2 billion a month, 24 billion a year in terms of compute revenue. And then on top of that, he has cursor coming in at the back end to fill those servers. So he is the most efficient core weave with the lowest cost of capital. Now, separate comment, it doesn't mean you have a foundation model. It means you're just a better core weave, but oh my God, did he, did he turn a loss into a win

53:01

SPEAKER_01

in the space of three months? I mean, in January 1st, you could have said, look at all those data centers and you don't have a foundation model. You're screwed. Here we are June 9th and he can say, I have a 24 billion dollar outsource business and I have this other business that's coming in that's going to be doing $6 billion that will run on my servers. I went. Yeah. Great move.

53:25

SPEAKER_02

And the Elon, an incredible transition. Two private rounds that were large. Ramp raises $750 at 44. We've discussed Ramp a lot, tripled in a year, cross a billion in ARR, positive free cash flow. And then also Suno, the AI music creator company, raised $400 million and a $5.4 billion, teasing first license model. Bond led that one. It was double the previous valuation just six months ago. Anything on either of those? I mean, Ramp, we've said it before.

54:00

SPEAKER_01

It's kind of gets to the revenue. They'll trade like financial companies, financial services companies, but they will be adjusted for growth. And you know, we also have, we kind of do them, you know, when Brex slowed down to our, I can't remember what it was, 30, 40%. They sold for six X and here we have Ramp. I've heard they're actually as much as 1.25 billion. So they're trading at 30 to 40 times, right? Whatever the number is, right? Of that order. And it's all, it's a growth path, right? And if the growth keeps up, this will be a smart round. And if the growth goes down to anything like quote unquote normalized growth, it won't be. And it's the

54:34

SPEAKER_01

same bet with Revolut. They raising at a hundred and something, they're doing what? Four and a half billion in revenue, you know, 1.5 billion in operating income, which is fricking amazing. These companies are great. And you know, banks don't trade at 40 times, 50 times earnings. They trade at 12 times. So on both of them, it's really just, I mean, people always say, you know, will this trade like a tech company or like a financial services company? And I was, it'll trade like a financial scurvy, but it will be adjusted for growth. And you know, Ramp is getting the growth and they just seem to do a very good job of writing the Zeitgeist and you know, their AI story,

55:11

SPEAKER_01

their adoption story. They just seem to do a good job on all that. So for now they got the growth. And as long as they got the growth, the math works and it's a big town. So we'll see.

55:22

SPEAKER_02

Jason, you're trying Suno, the music AI company.

55:27

SPEAKER_00

You having for your personless office, Suno, just playing AI music. I do like Suno. I do, I do, I do, I do pay for Suno. Um, it's one of those ones that if I were more cost sensitive, I would cancel my subscription because I think I pay 15 or 20 bucks a month for three songs. Um, and so there is, um, there, there are certain apps that I think they're fragile for certain users because, um, I'll, I'll pay to continue to pay them, but, but barely that, but the utilities there, but barely. Um, but, um, you know, it's, it is amazing. I, I don't, um, I'm not maybe even though I'm a customer for a while, um, and user, I, I, you know,

56:12

SPEAKER_00

the, the rate at which that valuation doubled and you know, the, the, the $20 billion outcome for it, I'm not smart enough to see it yet. So it, it, it, it feels a little bit to me like risk on, right? Because the revenue justifies it. The growth justifies it. The stickiness justifies it. The brand justifies it. It, it, nothing, nothing you can't lose an AI. Um, but I don't know. We'll see. We'll see it. We'll see. We'll see it. The IPO. I just don't know where all this money's coming

56:40

SPEAKER_02

from. No, I'm, I'm saying with all the IPOs and then rather you mentioned Revolut again, Rory, is that targeting 750 million with the secondary sale, um, that they're doing at the one 15. And then all the IPOs, we say, should we, where all this money's coming from?

56:55

SPEAKER_01

David Pérez There's always money when people aren't afraid. David Pérez Man, there's no money. And you know, when, when it gets scary, as I, I always say that, cause the converse, I actually came to my point. I always say the converse is important. When things get scary, it's not that money runs out. It's that money gets scared. Right. And in the same thing in a bull market, it's not that more money's been made. It's that people are brave. There'll always be money when people are brave and there'll be nothing but treasuries when they're not. David Pérez How long will they be brave for, Rory? David Pérez If I knew that, Harry, I wouldn't be sitting

57:26

SPEAKER_01

there talking to you. I'd be, I would trade in QQQ. I don't know. I mean, at some point they won't get brave, but right now, right now it fills everyone's risk on. So yeah, I think people are brave.

57:37

SPEAKER_00

David Pérez Well, we've all convinced ourselves the rules of change now, right? You can go one to a hundred in a year and so many other things have changed. We, we throw these numbers, these growth numbers out as if it doesn't require a massive change in externalities to justify them. David Pérez Like, oh, everyone, all the best startups go from one to a hundred in a year. One to 20 in a year is pretty good today. You want to be doing five to eight by the time you get out of YC. The rules have changed and they have changed, but there's a limit to how much the rules can change, right? There is, it's called GDP.

58:06

SPEAKER_01

Harry Sperger Yes. And it's also called human nature. I think that the rules have changed what's doable. But what we do is in the face of these increased opportunities, we all get more aggressive and we keep on getting aggressive until the only thing that stops us being aggressive is someone gets burnt, right? It's the whole Minsky analysis of, you know, you're going to do what you're going to do and it's going to continue. And the only thing that will stop it is overreaching. And the skill is to figure out when you're at that point. Like it was funny. Last Friday, there was a little dip

58:35

SPEAKER_01

and you never know why stocks go down when things were overpriced. But you know, the, the, the narrative was, you know, the, um, employment numbers were good. So therefore rates won't go down and therefore stocks went down and, you know, intellectually. Yeah. I generally find things don't go to hell in the hand basket because employment is good, but that's not going to be how this thing ends. Right.

58:56

SPEAKER_02

David Wright Well, it was because of chip. It was because of chip guidance to be clear as chip guidance of 16 billion, Mr. 17.2. David Wright Yeah. You're talking about Broadcom. David Wright Yeah.

59:06

SPEAKER_01

David Wright It was some of that. And then it was just David Wright Yeah. Yeah. But yes, they got, David Wright Definitely got guide. I mean, I think what that, David Wright If we're going to talk about that, David Wright All that said is when you're priced David Wright For perfection, which is always true, David Wright When you're priced for perfection, David Wright Even a small miss to expectations, David Wright Filters true very quickly. And that's all that happened there. David Wright You know, the semiconductor index is up 100% year to date. David Wright So it turns out it's pretty vulnerable to correction.

59:32

SPEAKER_02

David Wright Oh, well. David Wright One that's amazing, which we may not have comment on, David Wright But it is amazing. It's bending spoons. David Wright This is kind of a roll up play on David Wright On traditionally kind of consumer companies. David Wright Some of their properties are very well known, David Wright But, you know, Evernote, Vimeo, David Wright WeTransfer, AOL, Eventbrite, David Wright Very massively executed roll up strategy, David Wright A billion three in revenue, David Wright And they're filing to go public at $20 billion on in the US from Italy. I hasten to add, David Wright One of few large Italian success stories to be very blunt.

1:00:09

SPEAKER_02

David Wright I thought it was amazing. David Wright I don't know if you guys have comment on it, David Wright But I thought fantastic success story.

1:00:14

SPEAKER_00

David Wright Well, to me, the part I didn't, David Wright I didn't appreciate, and I do appreciate it, David Wright Is that they turned around these effing companies. David Wright I mean, Evernote was dead and they reaccelerated the growth of Evernote, David Wright With a fifth of the employees. David Wright I mean, it sure makes you think a lot of management teams are pretty suspect if David Wright If friggin' Ben and Spoons from Italy can turn Vimeo around, Evernote around, David Wright Good God. If AOL becomes the next hot thing, David Wright I mean, these guys are fucking geniuses.

1:00:50

SPEAKER_01

David Wright I think David Wright I did read it in detail because I was super interested, right? David Wright And turned around is an interesting expression. David Wright I mean, what they do, their MO is they buy these things, David Wright They cut all extraneous expenditure, David Wright including a lot of the acquisition expenditure. David Wright It's very like David Wright A little ironic, like the Vista playbook in Enterprise. David Wright And then they raise prices massively. David Wright So if you look, I actually tried to figure out the organic growth rate David Wright of each enterprise because they're growing nicely overall, but a large part of the

1:01:23

SPEAKER_01

David Wright The reason they're growing is they're adding new companies. David Wright So by definition, revenue go up, right? David Wright I think they had, I'm trying to find my notes here. David Wright I had the growth rate last year. David Wright It was stellar, like something like 90%, but most of it's acquisition. David Wright So you're trying to piece through, Jason, David Wright And then you're trying to find out what did they do in terms of growth by entity. David Wright That's the next level down. David Wright And even then they get pretty good growth rate, to your point out of the gate, right? David Wright But then you go one level below that.

1:01:47

SPEAKER_01

David Wright How do they do that? David Wright It's mainly price rising. David Wright It's very hard to get any sense of unit growth by individual products. David Wright So in other words, what they're doing is they're taking Evernote, David Wright As an example, it's doing 200 million in revenue. David Wright They just cut all the marketing initiatives other than high ROI stuff. David Wright So they take out 80% of the marketing spend, David Wright Focus the team on features, raise the prices 80% over the course of two years, 10% of the existing users go maybe 20%. David Wright Their net retention is reasonably decent.

1:02:21

SPEAKER_01

David Wright It's below 100, but it's reasonably decent. David Wright So they raise prices and the people who really want it stay, right? David Wright And it's really hard to grow new businesses, but what it means is it kicks off cash. David Wright And you know, let's get real here. David Wright Anyone who hasn't churned from AOL now ! Ain't churned until they die, right? David Wright So you can raise money on that. David Wright You know, you've had a whole two decades, people. David Wright I mean, it is 26 years since the AOL Time Warner acquisition, right? David Wright You've had 26 years to churn off this thing. David Wright You're going nowhere, right?

1:02:53

SPEAKER_01

David Wright So they have very sticky inertia customers and they stick it to them, right? David Wright It's an excellent business. David Wright I mean, you know, the big three properties are AOL, Eventbrite, and I want to say Vimeo. David Wright It was interesting in the top 10 or about 80%. David Wright I think Evernote, which I use is in the top 10, but not top three. David Wright You still use Evernote? David Wright I don't use it, but I have a bunch of stuff in it. David Wright So I paid for another year. David Wright I need to get it out and figure out where I'm going. David Wright It's a long story, but you know, I'm not using it.

1:03:21

SPEAKER_01

David Wright I'm using ChatGPT, but I got to get all my shit into one place. David Wright It's a long discussion. David Wright Well, they've increased pricing from... David Wright What was the last supper like? David Wright Sure, shut up. David Wright Let's focus on the business. David Wright So yeah, I looked at my goal. David Wright The odd thing is this is a consumer internet version of early Vista, Toma Brava. David Wright Buy those companies, cut the costs, raise the prices, and just, you know, probably tap them out. David Wright So the question, is it a great business? David Wright Should it go public at 20 times revenues or 15 times revenues?

1:03:58

SPEAKER_01

David Wright Maybe not, because you are relying on the acquisition for organic. David Wright I mean, you're not getting organic growth. David Wright You're getting a profitable business, and you know, you probably have to look at the David Wright But it's hard to value on a growth multiple, and you might be leaning in another David Wright But I think it's a great story, because everyone was playing in the enterprise space. David Wright What these guys realize is there's similar opportunity in the consumer side, David Wright Which simply, you know, just as, you know, the whole idea was in these verticals,

1:04:27

SPEAKER_01

David Wright No one's going to change their car dealer accounting system because they put prices up 20% David Wright In the same way, you know, the default consumer is going to stay. David Wright So it's totally sensible, an orthogonal plate, David Wright What everyone else was doing said it deserved the prize. David Wright Should the prize be 10 or 20? That's a different question. David Wright But yeah, great story.

1:04:48

SPEAKER_02

David Wright Does it diminish what we've previously said about the bar to go public today? David Wright You know, they don't get me wrong. They're that fantastic scale. It's a billion three in revenue, which is awesome. But we have said that we're seeing this kind of bifurcation and you need to be huge. David Wright No, you said it. I haven't said it.

1:05:06

SPEAKER_00

David Wright But they're growing what 70 or 80%? What are Ben's been growing? David Wright I mean, David Wright I mean, Rory would know better than me. I'm not even convinced the markets care as much as we think whether it's organic or inorganic. Salesforce itself is, David Wright The balance of it is inorganic at some point, and then it becomes organic. David Wright We don't even think about a lot of these David Wright As inorganic or again, I mean, does anybody really care? I mean, David Wright As long as it works, if they can keep finding these targets for the right price,

1:05:36

SPEAKER_00

David Wright If they can do what they did with Evernote, which is raise the pricing from $75 to $250 a year on average, right? If they can find enough of these without just running out of affordable targets, going to the founder's letter, it sounds better to me than starting something from scratch. David Wright There's got to be 800 unicorns to buy. Just go buy those ones.

1:05:57

SPEAKER_02

David Wright I really liked his letter. He said, David Wright Finding product market fit is just a continuous mission of luck David Wright In some ways. And then the execution machine built after that requires no luck at all.

1:06:09

SPEAKER_00

David Wright Totally. Absolutely. David Wright It's just traditionally, David Wright The Constellation version was one to two X revenues, right? I don't know what bending spoons blended David Wright Well, we do. David Wright Maybe it's not revenue based. I just don't know.

1:06:23

SPEAKER_01

David Wright Yeah. This is Constellation for consumer with, you know, a much higher valuation because right now, David Wright Software is under pressure and this stuff isn't. David Wright Speaking of big enough to go public, guys,

1:06:37

SPEAKER_02

David Wright Data Bricks come out today. No, no. We're going to do another round. We're going to do another round. 165 billion priced up from 134 billion earlier this year. Obviously not going public with that announcement anytime soon. How do we think about that?

1:06:59

SPEAKER_01

David Wright I mean, look, David Wright The argument we said for why the big model providers are going public are they have a huge capital need, right? And, you know, I actually think I was, might have been Diamond or someone who said, I mean, the Goldman guy said recently, there's three reasons to go public. You want capital, you want currency to buy other things, you want to get liquidity for your shareholders, right? If you don't have one of those three things, David Wright Then, you know, do you want the hassle? So I think Databricks, unlike these guys, for now at least, may well be in the position where their capital needs are still manageable. I mean,

1:07:34

SPEAKER_01

for context, reminder, the last private round at Antropic was 30 billion and the last private round at OpenAI was 122 billion, right? So this is less than, oh my God, it's 0.1% of the last OpenAI private round. So what that says is, if there's money to fund OpenAI, there was money to fund Databricks private. So they can do it for longer because it's just not the same need. It's a software company, it's not a month. They don't quote unquote have to. Now, I personally think you should at four or five billion in revenue at the margin. I think in the end, you'll find logically in the end,

1:08:11

SPEAKER_01

the cost of capital should be cheaper in the public markets. But right now it's not. Databricks can get capital at a higher revenue multiple because they're higher growth rate than Snowflake can and on hassle-free terms. I also think the other argument he did make, which does resonate a little with me, is the idea that this is just going to be a noisy year. I mean, you've got, you know, you've got, you know, SpaceX by Friday, you've got the two big model companies by the end of the year. There's just a lot going on. It may well be next year is a clean deal. But yeah. I mean, the bigger hard was they don't need, it's just the amount of money that you need to build a

1:08:50

SPEAKER_01

foundation model is two or three orders of magnitude more than anything else. So the imperative for those

1:08:56

SPEAKER_02

guys to do public is just different. All right, boys, is there anything that I've missed that you think we should discuss? Other things that made it to the top? SaaS now trades at a discount to the S&P 500 for the first time in history. Wow. That's sad.

1:09:12

SPEAKER_02

Meta weighing tens of billions more for capex spend following in the suit of Google. Zuck. Atta boy.

1:09:21

SPEAKER_00

I'll tell you the only, I'll tell you about the one, what small one I'll pick just for fun, if we're breaking. I think it's actually a more important story, but maybe it takes time to track. It is, you know, Microsoft's new models that it launches, right? Which I think it said, they were clear there. I don't know what terms they use. Sorry, I'm traveling. It's in beta. I found it very interesting that the models can't even search the web. So there are certainly use cases where that's not important, but it's interesting to me that you would launch a model that can't extend its knowledge by searching the web. It's a flashback to when this

1:09:56

SPEAKER_00

show started when basically, you know, every, you chat, talk to chat GPT and everything was nine months ago, right? I don't remember. I don't, I have my memories only through September, 2024. So the only thing that says to me is hard to predict whether anyone can, can really, we, we, we think everyone can catch up. We think Microsoft can catch up. We think deep seek and open source can catch up, but if Microsoft launches these models and it doesn't even search the web, can we really keep up with the pace at Anthropic? I mean, the pace of change is so rapid. It's so impressive, like so much progress. I just don't, I just can't predict. I can't predict where we'll,

1:10:37

SPEAKER_00

we'll play out over the rest of the year next year. I can't predict.

1:10:39

SPEAKER_01

But you are right, Jason. It, it didn't matter because it was the final recognition that frankly we should say for ages is you can't for Microsoft to have such a core foundational technology and the, the way they don't control it just wasn't the long-term sustainable state. And you know, they and open AI are somewhere between an open relationship, but actually divorced. I can't quite figure it out. Well, they're allowed out of partners, but they're still together. I can't quite, but whatever. Oh, Microsoft needs its own control and they needed to do this. And you're right,

1:11:10

SPEAKER_01

Jason is it, you know, the reviews, I haven't used it yet. The reviews are like good, but not even as good as the best open source. But my takeaway on is, you know, well done because you needed to do something and you, it's hard to imagine not playing here. And they tell a story about, you know, local use and, you know, range of models and which I read all as some version of, we don't have to be the very best because we know we're not the very best in general in life. You need to be the very best, but at least you need to be playing. It's a step, it's a step to the goal. And that's why Google is

1:11:41

SPEAKER_01

so much further ahead. They're at least in the game. But yeah, this was the end of the period where you could fool yourself even slightly that your plan for, uh, your plan for AI is to partner with open AI. That's just not the answer anymore. And it hasn't been for a couple of years for Microsoft. So yeah, I mean, onwards from here, my guess is they'll, you know, they will become the next sucking sound for talent and money. And you're right. They need to add the stuff that the other guys added two years ago. You know, can they, I hadn't thought, it's an interesting question. Can they do the Microsoft thing and grind their way to good enough over three to four years?

1:12:22

SPEAKER_01

Like Azure was never as good as AWS, but it was good enough for most of their corporates. Can they grind to something that's good enough in this space over the next two or three years, whereby they're not going to be as good as Entropic or OpenAI, but they're good enough for the bulk of low end intelligence work. I don't know. It's an interesting question. I mean, they never caught up in mobile. They never caught up in search. They did catch up in, uh, cloud compute, cloud compute with Azure and you know, who knows here, but you're right. It is the one that matters. I mean, that and the, you know, where are the, I mean, one of the big questions is between Microsoft

1:13:03

SPEAKER_01

and then the open source vendors are the open source vendors, especially, is it going to be a non-Chinese U S open source vendor? That's kind of even within the spitting distance of the frontier models. Cause that matters a lot from a pricing perspective. I think there's, there's a lot of open

1:13:17

SPEAKER_02

source models today that are within spitting distance now. Yeah, there are, but mainly Chinese.

1:13:23

SPEAKER_01

And yeah, the question, and I, yeah, the question then is, you know, is that sustainable? And a lot of our companies are using them and is that sustainable, even though it's open source, is that sustainable over the medium term? Is it, if your only plan is you can download Kimmy or DeepSeek and you can, you know, fine tune it, that's great. But A, some of those Chinese companies are themselves going closed source. I think what happens to a U S what happens in terms of an open source competitor in the U S matters. And obviously you've got, I think it's recursive and poolside, a couple of

1:13:54

SPEAKER_01

reflection and poolside doing that. But that's, that's to Jason's point. Sometimes you get caught up in the stories and you, you're the worst for that, Harry, because you just love the gossip, but Jason's right. What really matters is, is this going to be an oligopoly? Or is it going to be four or five players in foundation model and two years from now, which is why what Microsoft did

1:14:15

SPEAKER_02

matters. I just did a show with the founder of Nabius and he said the single biggest threat to Nabius is consolidation of models. Yes. If we have concentration of model kind of winning, we are in a tough space and we want an ecosystem, not a monopoly. Yes. There's a reason, yes, that everyone,

1:14:33

SPEAKER_01

other than Anthropic and open AI, shoving money furiously at anyone else who can help

1:14:38

SPEAKER_02

or grow that competitive advantage. Now, I just did a show with Aaron, the perplexity, and he said that export controls have actually hurt the U S in many ways, because it's meant that they've innovated on architecture that they wouldn't have needed to and really built muscle that they wouldn't have had to. And combined with the open source model capability that they have, it's now a competitive threat that's even stronger. It was an interesting discussion. Rory, I have to say, uh, we'll wrap. My mother text me after our last episode and said that your quote on making money is

1:15:07

SPEAKER_02

like sex was the favorite moment of any trio show that she's heard. And I got about 50 texts from people being like, that is the quote of the century. I've got to tell you, I think it's

1:15:20

SPEAKER_01

not in direct format, but there's a version like there's a version of that either in Fred Schwed's where are the customers yachts from the 1960s or in reminiscence of a stock operator from the 1920s. One of those two investing books hinted at that, but I always remembered it. So I, I'm not the original author, but I, but, but, but the books are kind of three to five times older than you are, Harry. So it's kind of like the Bible as far as you're concerned.

1:15:50

So just just just ! just just ! ! ! just just

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